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WHEN TRADEMARK LAW MET 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HOW A 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH THEORY CAN 
SAVE THE LANHAM ACT 
Abstract: On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court sent shockwaves through the 
bedrock of trademark law with its decision in Matal v. Tam. Justice Alito’s major-
ity opinion declared the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act unconstitution-
al due to viewpoint discrimination. Two years later, on June 24, 2019, in Iancu v. 
Brunetti, the Court continued to shake the foundation of trademark law by declar-
ing the immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham Act unconstitutional due to 
viewpoint discrimination. Both the Tam and the Brunetti Courts, however, pro-
vided no enlightenment for practitioners regarding whether trademarks are com-
mercial speech. By failing to answer this crucial question, the Court left open the 
issue of available limits on the government’s restrictions on speech, or if there 
are even limits at all. This Note argues that the law should treat trademarks as 
commercial speech. The Central Hudson test for intermediate scrutiny is appro-
priate for identifying a compelling government interest that is related to trade-
mark restrictions at issue. Otherwise, a strict scrutiny analysis of trademarks 
jeopardizes a vast majority of the United States’ signature trademark act: the 
Lanham Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks define our commerce system, and with the recent Supreme 
Court cases Matal v. Tam and Iancu v. Brunetti, trademarks are defining the 
scope of government restrictions on free speech.1 Trademarks indicate to con-
sumers the source of a good or service.2 Federal registration of a trademark 
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) provides a mark 
owner with the exclusive right to use the trademark throughout the United 
States.3 In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act to provide guidelines for 
                                                                                                                           
 1 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND 
STATE IP PROTECTIONS 861 (2018); see Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (addressing 
the constitutionality of speech restrictions against immoral and scandalous marks on trademark regis-
tration); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (Tam III) (addressing the constitutionality of 
speech restrictions against disparaging marks on trademark registration). 
 2 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADE-
MARK: ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 2 (2018), https://www.uspto.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/G335-UMS4]. 
 3 Id. at 11. 
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trademark registration.4 Although recent Supreme Court cases have altered the 
scope of the Lanham Act, this signature trademark act, as written, prohibits 
registration of offensive trademarks, confusing trademarks, trademarks that are 
immoral or scandalous, and trademarks that are geographically misdescrip-
tive.5 Through this Act, the USPTO registers over 240,000 trademarks a year, 
and most of these trademarks will never make headlines.6 But when controver-
sial trademarks capture the attention of the public and the courts, the ensuing 
cases have changed the face of trademark law.7 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Jordan Lewis, The Future of Disparagement: How Trademark Law 
Suppresses Freedom of Speech 4 (Apr. 9, 2017) (unpublished student note) (Southern University Law 
Center), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2949497 [https://perma.cc/4KGX-Z2N9]. 
Our federal government and judiciary system does not take lightly the restriction of expression inher-
ent to any exclusive right to use a phrase and, consequently, has created a robust framework of gov-
erning law. See Ross A. Dannenberg & Heather R. Smith-Carra, Balancing Free Speech and Trade-
mark Rights, BANNER & WITCOFF, Spring/Summer 2017, at 6, https://bannerwitcoff.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/07/Balancing-Free-Speech-and-Trademark-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8F5-FRLR] 
(noting the tension between First Amendment rights and trademark laws and the creation of the fair 
use doctrine, which allows third parties to use a registered mark if certain threshold requirements, like 
a lack of misleading customers, are met); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3 
(identifying threshold requirements for trademark registration, including the small likelihood of con-
fusion with other marks and the strength of the mark’s connection to the product or service). To pro-
mote the free flow of commerce, the government does not grant every trademark application. U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3; see Peter C. Christensen & Teresa C. Tucker, The 
“Use in Commerce” Requirement for Trademark Registration After Larry Harmon Pictures, 32 IDEA 
327, 327 (1992) (describing the connection of the Commerce Clause to Congress’s power to regulate 
trademark). Our modern trademark system, founded from the enactment of the Lanham Act of 1946, 
and in place for over half a century, allows the government to restrict the registration of certain trade-
marks. Christensen & Tucker, supra, at 327.  
 5 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012); see Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 (holding that speech restrictions on 
trademark registration for immoral and scandalous marks are unconstitutional); Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 
1764 (holding that speech restrictions on trademark registration for disparaging marks are unconstitu-
tional). 
 6 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CITIZEN CENTRIC RE-
PORT 2018, at 2 (2018) (detailing the registration of hundreds of thousands of trademarks). In 2018, 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) registered 273,808 trademarks. Id. This was an in-
crease from the 242,709 registered trademarks in fiscal year 2017. Id.; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CITIZEN CENTRIC REPORT 2017, at 2 (2017). 
 7 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1342 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Tam II), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (focus-
ing on inconsistency in the USPTO’s registration of disparaging trademarks); In re Steven Hershey, 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1470, 1472 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (reversing the USPTO’s initial denial of trademark for the 
“BIG PECKER BRAND” on immoral and scandalous grounds); Fred Barbash, Warning: This Article 
on Trademarks May Include Language Deemed “Scandalous, Immoral or Disparaging,” WASH. 
POST (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/30/the-
idiotic-history-of-deeming-trademarks-scandalous-immoral-or-disparaging/ [https://perma.cc/NZX6-
LH7N] (describing the sensationalism of several trademarks out of the thousands that are registered by 
the USPTO). In 1988, in the “BIG PECKER BRAND” case, the USPTO initially denied the trade-
mark, finding “pecker” to be synonymous for “penis” and thus rendering it as vulgar. In re Steven 
Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470. On appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), the 
trademark applicant successfully convinced the Board that it intended “pecker” to refer to a bird, cit-
ing the bird imagery on the t-shirt tied to the trademark use. Id. at 1472. More recently, in 2011, the 
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In 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia can-
celled the long-standing trademark of the Washington Redskins, a team in the 
National Football League (NFL).8 Plaintiffs challenged the trademark under 
the federal prohibition on disparaging or offensive marks.9 The federal district 
court held that the Redskins’ trademark offended and disparaged Native Amer-
icans, and, as such, the mark was not entitled to federal trademark protec-
tions.10 The Washington Redskins appealed the decision, which was stayed 
pending resolution of another case challenging the disparaging clause as a free 
speech violation: Matal v. Tam, a case which the Supreme Court would hear in 
2017.11 In Tam, an Asian-American rock band appealed the denial of its trade-
mark application for its band name, “THE SLANTS.”12 Despite the band’s 
desire to reclaim the derogatory term “slants,” the USPTO denied registration 
because it found the term was nonetheless offensive to Asians.13 On appeal in 
                                                                                                                           
USPTO denied registration of the trademark “HAVE YOU HEARD SATAN IS A REPUBLICAN” 
due to the phrase’s disparagement of the Republican party. Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1342 n.7. In 2013, 
however, the USPTO did not find a similar trademark, “THE DEVIL IS A DEMOCRAT,” to dispar-
age the Democratic party. Id. The inevitable appearance of arbitrariness in the USPTO’s reviewing of 
immoral, scandalous, or disparaging trademarks led the Supreme Court in 2017 to address the uncon-
stitutionality of prohibitions against disparaging trademarks. See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (granting 
certiorari to resolve whether the disparagement clause in § 2(a) of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment). Following the Court’s decision on disparagement prohibitions, the Court 
in 2019 granted certiorari to resolve the constitutionality of prohibitions against immoral and scandal-
ous trademarks. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019) (granting certiorari to address whether 
the immoral or scandalous clauses of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act are unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment). The Court held the immoral and scandalous clause was unconstitutional because it 
improperly restricted First Amendment rights. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 8 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 490 (E.D. Va. 2015). The football fran-
chise first used the team name “Redskins” in 1933. Id. at 448. By 1967, the USPTO registered the 
trademark, renewing it most recently in 2015. Id. Although the Washington Redskins is not the only 
potentially offensive national sports team name, teams nationwide have trended toward shifting their 
names to less offensive ones. Mark Conrad, Matal v. Tam—A Victory for the Slants, a Touchdown for 
the Redskins, but an Ambiguous Journey for the First Amendment and Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 105–06 (2018). Like the Redskins trademark, the Cleveland Indians baseball 
team and the Chicago Blackhawks hockey team are unlikely to alter their team names despite requests 
to do so. Id. at 125 n.250. In the wake of criticism, however, many collegiate teams renamed them-
selves, including Stanford University, which changed its mascot from an Indian to a Cardinal and St. 
John’s University, which altered its team name from “Redman” to “Red Storm.” List of Schools That 
Changed Native American Nicknames, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/2013/09/12/native-american-mascot-changes-ncaa/2804337/ [https://perma.cc/9P4M-
8U3K]. 
 9 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012); Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 490. 
 10 Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 472. 
 11 137 S. Ct. at 1765; Conrad, supra note 8, at 112. 
 12 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1747; see infra notes 161–177 (explaining that the band first appealed the 
examiner’s denial of its trademark appeal to the TTAB, and then to the Federal Circuit; after an en 
banc ruling, the government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court). 
 13 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1747. 
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2017, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the USPTO and ruled that 
the prohibition against disparaging trademarks was unconstitutional.14 
With one decision, the Supreme Court in Tam threw into doubt longstand-
ing precedent on the constitutionality of key portions in the Lanham Act.15 
Although the boundaries of government restrictions on speech are still evolv-
ing before the Court, Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Tam suggested what 
speech is constitutionally permissible for the government to restrict.16 In a 
unanimous opinion, the Court held that the provision of the Lanham Act that 
prohibited registering any disparaging trademarks was an unconstitutional re-
striction of speech.17 The provision at issue was the disparagement clause that 
required a trademark examiner to refuse federal registration of a trademark if 
the trademark at issue offends a “substantial composite of the referenced 
group.”18 In Tam, the Court found the disparagement clause to be a content-
based restriction that allowed trademark examiners to engage in unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination.19 Viewpoint-based restrictions are restrictions, 
imposed by a state actor, which offend the First Amendment by allowing some 
views and prohibiting other disfavored views.20 This is in contrast to content-
neutral restrictions that regulate all related speech based on “time, place, and 
manner,” rather than on content.21 In Tam, the Court limited its viewpoint dis-
crimination analysis to the disparagement clause.22 Yet § 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act, the section that contains the disparagement clause, also contains a prohibi-
                                                                                                                           
 14 Id. at 1765. 
 15 See id. (modifying longstanding precedent on the constitutionality of the Lanham Act and hold-
ing, by a unanimous court, that the disparagement clause of the Act violates the Constitution); Matal 
v. Tam, 131 HARV. L. REV. 243, 243 (2017) (describing the “New Lochner” era of commercial speech 
deregulation that followed the decision in Tam III).  
 16 See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 
167–70 (2018) (outlining the current state of available government restrictions on corporations); see, 
e.g., Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 (holding trademark restrictions against immoral and scandalous 
marks unconstitutional); Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (holding trademark restrictions against disparag-
ing marks unconstitutional). 
 17 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (prohibiting registration of disparaging 
marks); infra notes 157–189 and accompanying text (detailing the facts and evolution of Tam III to 
the Supreme Court). 
 18 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1754; see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1203.03(b)(i) (2014) [hereinafter 
TRADEMARK MANUAL] (using the substantial composite test first formulated in In re McGinley, 660 
F.2d 481, 483 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).  
 19 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Conrad, supra note 8, at 
101 n.97; Timothy T. Hsieh, The Hybrid Trademark and Free Speech Right Forged from Matal v. 
Tam, 7 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 16–17 (2018). 
 22 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1753. 
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tion on registering trademarks that are of an immoral or scandalous nature.23 
The Court left the constitutionality of the immoral and scandalous clause un-
touched in the Tam decision, leaving the issue open for a future case.24 
The Tam Court also refrained from defining the level of scrutiny that 
trademark restrictions must withstand.25 Scrutiny analysis aids the Court in 
                                                                                                                           
 23 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Although the text of the clause refers to immoral or scandalous marks, the 
USPTO and case law refer to the two terms as a “single category.” Thus, for purposes of this Note, the 
terms will be referred to as the immoral and scandalous clauses. Brief of Petitioner at 6, Iancu v. Bru-
netti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302), 2019 WL 913833, at *6; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484 
n.6. 
 24 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1753. The Tam III decision only explicitly discussed the disparagement 
clause of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Id. Section 2(a), however, also prohibits registration of “immoral” 
and “scandalous” marks; lower courts have held these prohibitions unconstitutional using the same 
rationale as the Supreme Court in Tam III. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302; Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1753; 
see In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017)  (holding the immoral and scandalous clause 
of the Lanham Act unconstitutional for similar viewpoint discrimination reasons after examiner de-
nied applicant’s “FUCT” clothing trademark on immoral and scandalous grounds), cert. granted, 139 
S. Ct. 782 (2019). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to In re Brunetti on January 6, 2019, after an 
unopposed petition by the government asked the Court to consider whether the immoral and scandal-
ous clauses of the Lanham Act are facially invalid under the First Amendment. 139 S. Ct. at 782; 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019) (No. 18-302), 2018 WL 4331883. 
The plaintiff-respondent, Brunetti, asked the Court to additionally consider whether the clauses are 
void for vagueness and thus unconstitutional because of free speech and due process concerns. Dennis 
Crouch, What the Fu**—Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Brunetti Trademark Dispute, PATENTLYO 
BLOG (Jan. 6, 2019), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/01/supreme-brunetti-trademark.html [https://
perma.cc/N7EL-JWQ2]. Importantly, neither the government nor Brunetti asked the Court to consider 
whether trademarks are commercial speech. See id. (noting that the parties asked the Court only to 
answer whether the immoral and scandalous clauses are facially invalid or void for vagueness). The 
Court only considered whether the immoral and scandalous clauses are facially invalid. Brunetti, 139 
S. Ct. at 2298. Given the Court’s reluctance to address the commercial speech question in Tam III, it 
is unsurprising that the Court did not raise the issue sua sponte. See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (de-
clining to answer the question of whether trademarks are commercial speech); infra notes 251−287 
and accompanying text (arguing a commercial speech theory of trademarks would provide a uniform 
and predictive analysis for deciding such issues). Writing for the Court, Justice Elena Kagan held the 
First Amendment concerns at issue in Brunetti are reminiscent of those in Tam III. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 
at 2298–99. She reasoned that, like the disparaging clause in Tam that the Court found unconstitution-
al based on viewpoint discrimination, the disputed clause in Brunetti was also unconstitutional due to 
viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 2299. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who wrote the majority in Tam III, 
concurred in the judgment in Brunetti. Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring). He alluded to the nuances in 
his stance on viewpoint discrimination by suggesting that Congress could restrict vulgar statements by 
creating a narrower statute. Id. Justice Sonia Sotomayor prioritized a savings interpretation of the 
statute to avoid striking the clause in its entirety. Id. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). She sought to uphold the scandalous piece of the clause as it reaches “obscenity, vul-
garity, and profanity,” which have been viewed by prior decisions as outside the reach of First 
Amendment protections. Id. at 2308. Following Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning, Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr. similarly concurred in part by striking the immoral part of the Lanham Act and dissented 
in part by finding the scandalous part of the clause to be constitutional. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part). Also, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer 
was the only justice to mention “commercial speech.” Id. at 2304–05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). Nonetheless, he too declined to provide a concrete answer on the nature of trade-
marks as commercial speech. Id.  
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determining the constitutionality of speech restrictions—strict scrutiny is the 
highest level of scrutiny and, consequently, the lowest level of deference a 
court may afford to the government’s justification for its speech restriction.26 
When a speech restriction like a trademark prohibition faces strict scrutiny, the 
government must prove first that it has a “compelling interest” in implement-
ing its restriction, and second that the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet 
that interest.27 The lowest level of scrutiny is rational basis review, requiring 
the government only to have a “legitimate interest” for its restriction.28 The 
next level is intermediate scrutiny, which requires the government to prove it 
has a “substantial interest” in its regulation, and that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to that interest.29 Commercial speech—speech that implicates a busi-
ness transaction—is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and such speech requires 
the government to assert a substantial interest directly related to its re-
striction.30 In contrast, non-commercial speech, which includes both individual 
speech and everything outside the realm of commercial speech, is subject to 
the higher burden of a strict scrutiny analysis.31 Despite the scrutiny distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial speech, the Court remained silent on 
what level of scrutiny to afford the disparagement clause.32 
Although the decision in Tam illuminated the intersection of trademark 
law and First Amendment rights, the holding left practitioners in the dark on 
whether the “immoral” and “scandalous” provisions of § 2(a) of the Lanham 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749. This Note considers in depth the analysis of the Tam decision, as 
its progeny—the Brunetti decision—builds on the analysis Tam laid out. See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 
2297 (citing to Tam and finding the immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham Act unconstitu-
tional based on viewpoint discrimination). This is due to the fact that the Brunetti Court used the same 
reasoning of the Tam court to find the disparagement clause unconstitutional. Id. Notably, the Tam 
decision explicitly refrains from addressing whether trademarks are commercial speech, whereas the 
Brunetti opinion does not mention “commercial speech” at all. Compare Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 
(explicitly declining to “resolve the dispute” over whether trademarks are commercial speech), with 
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2302 (making no mention of “commercial speech” in the Court’s opinion). 
 26 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137. 
 27 Id. A restriction on speech is narrowly tailored when it limits speech no more than is necessary 
to serve the government’s compelling interest. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). 
 28 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980). 
 31 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983). Although there is no explicit 
statutorily defined or judge-made distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech, the 
Court attempted to create a test to categorize whether speech is commercial or not. Id. at 66; Jennifer 
L. Pomeranz & Sabrina Adler, Defining Commercial Speech in the Context of Food Marketing, 2015 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 40, 41. The test asks whether the speech is meant to be an advertisement, wheth-
er the focus of the speech is advertising a specific product, and if the speaker has an economic motiva-
tion in the speech. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65–67.  
 32 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (refraining from considering whether trademarks are commer-
cial speech). 
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Act are constitutional, and whether trademarks are commercial speech.33 If 
trademarks are not commercial speech, then the government will likely fail to 
meet the high burden required to survive strict scrutiny analysis for trademark 
restrictions, leading to further dismantling of the Lanham Act.34 A commercial 
speech analysis of trademarks will preserve the modern trademark system that 
protects against dilution and tarnishment of marks, which are arguably content-
based restrictions that would only be upheld as constitutional under an inter-
mediate scrutiny analysis.35 Because commercial speech receives intermediate 
scrutiny, some content-based restrictions receive intermediate rather than strict 
scrutiny.36 
The Tam decision only addressed the binary distinction between content-
based and content-neutral speech and unfortunately failed to address how 
commercial speech intersects with that binary.37 Thus, the extent to which the 
government can restrict trademark registration based on the mark’s content and 
the future of the Lanham Act remain open questions.38 This Note argues that 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See id. (leaving open the question of whether trademarks are commercial speech). Compare 
Conrad, supra note 8, at 141–42 (arguing that the Court should abandon the artificial distinction be-
tween commercial and non-commercial speech altogether), with Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amend-
ment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 382 
(2016) (addressing the importance of maintaining a distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech). 
 34 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 106-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730–32 
(2006) (updating the cause of action for dilution first articulated in the Federal Dilution Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, 985–87 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127), which allows a 
registered trademark owner to preserve the distinctiveness and reputation of the mark’s brand through 
litigation); Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (declining to specify that trademarks are commercial speech); 
infra notes 251−287 (discussing how, under a strict scrutiny analysis, the immoral and scandalous 
clauses would likely be found unconstitutional and the Federal Dilution Act, which complements the 
Lanham Act, would also be found unconstitutional). 
 35 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2 (revising causes of action for dilution and tarnish-
ment from Federal Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, 985–87 (1995) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127)); Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (refraining from establishing whether trade-
marks are commercial speech); Lynda J. Oswald, Tarnishment and Blurring Under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 263–64 (1999) (defining dilution by blurring 
and dilution by tarnishment); infra notes 251−287 (detailing how an intermediate scrutiny analysis 
preserves trademark restrictions on speech). Dilution by blurring provides a cause of action when a 
mark potentially loses its uniqueness in the marketplace. Oswald, supra, at 263–64. Dilution by tar-
nishment, on the other hand, provides a cause of action when a mark owner’s reputation is potentially 
damaged. Id. 
 36 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137; see Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (hinting that a content-
based restriction could be constitutional under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, but that the dispar-
agement clause at issue was unconstitutional due to viewpoint discrimination). 
 37 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (failing to engage in a commercial speech analysis and focusing 
instead on the content-based analysis). 
 38 See id. (ruling narrowly on the disparagement clause and refraining from interpreting its effects 
on other clauses within § 2(a) of the Lanham Act); supra note 19 and accompanying text (analyzing 
the implications of the Court granting certiorari in In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. 
260 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:253 
trademarks are a form of commercial speech and should receive intermediate 
scrutiny.39 Failing to define trademarks as commercial speech could endanger 
large parts of the Lanham Act.40 This consequence only happens under a strict 
scrutiny analysis.41 But under intermediate scrutiny, the government may regu-
late registration of trademarks so long as there is a substantial government in-
terest that is narrowly tailored to the regulation.42 The substantial government 
interest in trademark regulation is in ensuring the free flow of commerce.43 
Part I of this Note begins by describing the history of trademark law and 
the previous standards for evaluating the disparagement clause.44 Part I further 
explains the distinctions between commercial versus non-commercial speech 
and content-based versus content-neutral restrictions.45 Finally, Part I summa-
rizes the key takeaways from Tam including its multiple concurrences and its 
holdings at the lower court levels.46 Part II of this Note discusses the fate of the 
immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham Act and the likely effects that 
would result if the remaining clauses were declared unconstitutional.47 Part III 
                                                                                                                           
granted, 139 S. Ct. 782, and reasoning the immoral and scandalous clauses of the Lanham Act are 
unconstitutional on the same viewpoint discrimination grounds as in Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749). 
 39 See infra notes 251−287 and accompanying text (detailing how an intermediate scrutiny analy-
sis will preserve trademark restrictions in the Lanham Act). 
 40 See infra notes 251−273 and accompanying text (describing how under a strict scrutiny analy-
sis, rather than an intermediate scrutiny analysis, parts of the Lanham Act that include the immoral 
and scandalous clauses and registration restrictions based on dilution would be held unconstitutional). 
 41 See infra notes 251−287 and accompanying text (reasoning that a strict scrutiny analysis will 
have widespread effects on the constitutionality of dilution law). Moreover, a strict scrutiny analysis 
would place a higher burden on the government to identify a substantial government interest, thus 
leading to greater government regulation of advertising restrictions. See infra notes 251–287 and ac-
companying text. 
 42 John V. Tait, Note, Trademark Regulations and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: Focusing on 
the Regulatory Objective to Classify Speech for First Amendment Analysis, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 897, 
911 n.122 (1998). 
 43 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (acknowledging that the intent of the Lanham Act is to “regulate 
commerce”); Brief of Petitioner at 8, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293), 2016 WL 
6678795 (identifying the government’s asserted interest in regulating the flow of commerce). 
Michelle K. Lee was the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the 
USPTO until June 2017 when Joseph Matal was named Interim Director of the USPTO. See Joseph 
Matal, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/executive-biographies/
joseph-matal [https://perma.cc/L32M-QBB7]; Michelle K. Lee, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/executive-biographies/michelle-k-lee [https://perma.cc/L4VU-CS6W]. 
 44 See infra notes 57−114 and accompanying text (summarizing the state of the Lanham Act prior 
to the Court’s decision in Tam III). 
 45 See infra notes 115−153 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between commer-
cial and non-commercial speech for First Amendment protection analysis). 
 46 See infra notes 154−189 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of Tam up to and 
including the decision by the Court in Tam III). 
 47 See infra notes 190−250 and accompanying text (describing the arguments for and against 
trademarks’ characterization as commercial speech and the potential effects on other aspects of the 
Lanham Act based on that characterization). 
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proposes an answer to the dodged question in Tam on the commercial speech 
status of trademarks—that trademarks are in fact commercial speech.48 
I. HOW THE DISPARAGEMENT CLAUSE RESTRICTED TRADEMARK 
REGISTRATION, AND THE IMPACT OF ITS EVENTUAL  
DISMANTLING ON FREE SPEECH LAW 
The Lanham Act first codified trademark statutory law in 1946, and it has 
remained largely unchanged since its most recent amendment in 2006.49 But 
recently, the Supreme Court called into question key statutory restrictions on 
trademarks, raising greater doubts about the legitimacy of the government’s 
ability to regulate trademarks at all.50 When the Court in Matal v. Tam held that 
the disparagement clause was facially unconstitutional, it opened the flood-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See infra notes 251−287 and accompanying text (arguing that trademarks are commercial 
speech because of the widespread impacts that would likely occur if trademarks did not receive an 
intermediate scrutiny analysis). 
 49 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2 (updating the Lanham Act, specifically modifying 
the requirement to prove dilution to be likelihood of dilution rather than evidence of actual dilution). 
Before Tam III, the last case to consider the constitutionality of the Lanham Act’s registration re-
quirements was In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484−85 (C.C.P.A. 1981); see Lisa P. Ramsey, A Free 
Speech Right to Trademark Protection?, 106 TRADEMARK REP. 797, 817 (2016) (arguing that like its 
holding in In re McGinley, the Court should uphold the constitutionality of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act). 
The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which is the predecessor to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, heard In re McGinley in 1981. Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
97-164, § 122, 96 Stat. 25, 36 (1982); 660 F.2d at 482. In re McGinley concerned a trademark applica-
tion for a mark used in a newsletter covering interpersonal relationships. 660 F.2d at 482. The mark 
was a photograph of a naked couple hugging and kissing. Id. The photograph also depicted the male’s 
exposed genitalia. Id. The USPTO declined to register the mark because of its immoral and scandal-
ous nature. Id. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals denied the trademark appli-
cant’s claim that § 2(a) of the Lanham Act was an infringement on his free speech rights. Id. at 484. 
The court held that § 2(a) of the Lanham Act, prohibiting immoral and scandalous marks, was consti-
tutional. Id. The court reasoned that denial of a trademark application did not suppress speech because 
the applicant could still use the mark freely, albeit without the federal government’s promise of exclu-
sive use. Id. The court further stated that the scandalous clause was not void for vagueness because the 
clause provided sufficient notice to applicants that the USPTO would not approve marks that are im-
moral and scandalous. Id. at 485. 
 50 See Hsieh, supra note 21, at 3 (justifying the new “hybrid Free Speech trademark right” due to 
the balancing concerns between the First Amendment and intellectual property rights). One scholar 
celebrated the ruling in Tam III because removal of content-based restrictions on trademarks brought 
trademark law into alignment with the rest of intellectual property law, as there are virtually no bars 
on registration based on the content of any copyright or patent. Id. For example, copyright law allows 
protection for any work in a fixed medium so long as it meets threshold originality requirements. 17 
U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Hsieh, supra note 21, at 3. In patent law, the only major content restriction is a 
rarely enforced and arguably obsolete restriction on atomic weapon patents. Hsieh, supra note 21, at 
3. The scholar argued that, as demonstrated by copyright and patent law, embracing the full potential 
of First Amendment protections does not hinder intellectual property development and can even en-
courage its progress. Id. at 24. For instance, removing content-based restrictions on offensive trade-
marks empowers historically underrepresented groups, like the Asian-American rock group “THE 
SLANTS” in Tam III, to reclaim derogatory language. Id. The scholar further argued that First 
Amendment concerns outweigh any governmental need for trademark restrictions. Id. 
262 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:253 
gates for further Lanham Act challenges.51 If tasked with determining whether 
the Lanham Act’s registration requirements are intolerable restrictions on 
speech, the Court will likely be forced to decide the level of scrutiny that 
trademark regulations must withstand.52 
This Part explains why the Tam decision impacts larger free speech case 
law and how the looming questions left by Tam might affect the analysis of fu-
ture First Amendment rights cases.53 Section A highlights how courts previously 
interpreted the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act as a constitutionally 
valid measure to restrict registration of offensive and derogatory trademarks.54 
Section B explains the modern commercial speech and content-neutral theories 
that enlighten the boundaries of free speech that the government may regulate.55 
Section C discusses the evolution of Tam from the lower courts to the Supreme 
Court, and the open question of whether trademarks are commercial speech.56 
A. The Lanham Act’s Restriction on Registering  
Derogatory and Offensive Trademarks 
Trademarks prevent consumer confusion by granting mark owners exclu-
sive use of registered symbols, words, and phrases that represent the products 
and services they sell.57 This allows customers to distinguish between different 
goods and services, especially in crowded marketplaces.58 Accordingly, in 
1870, in an effort to regulate the marketplace at the federal level, Congress 
enacted the first comprehensive trademark registration act.59 By 1876, howev-
er, in evaluating a series of three consolidated cases that would later become 
known as the Trade-Mark Cases—United States v. Steffens, United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
 51 137 S. Ct. at 1749; see In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357 (challenging the aspect of the content-
based restrictions of the immoral and scandalous clauses that Tam III did not discuss). 
 52 See infra notes 251−259 and accompanying text (arguing that if the Court does not determine 
whether trademarks receive intermediate scrutiny, then other aspects of the Lanham Act, such as pro-
tections against dilution, likely will be held unconstitutional). 
 53 See infra notes 57−189 and accompanying text (providing context for the question created by 
the Court’s decision in Tam III). 
 54 See infra notes 57−114 and accompanying text (discussing the prior state of the disparagement 
clause before the Court’s decision in Tam III). 
 55 See infra notes 115−153 and accompanying text (detailing the prevailing theories describing 
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech). 
 56 See infra notes 154−189 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the Tam decision 
and opinions throughout the case’s procedural history). 
 57 Russ VerSteeg, Historical Perspectives & Reflections on “Matal v. Tam” and the Future of 
Offensive Trademarks, 25 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 134 (2017); Tait, supra note 42, at 901 (correlating 
innovation and growth during the industrial revolution of the late 1800s with the need for a unified 
trademark system). 
 58 VerSteeg, supra note 57, at 134. 
 59 An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights, 
§§ 77–84, 16 Stat. 198, 210–12 (1870). Under the Act, the first user of a mark has exclusive rights to 
the mark over any subsequent users of the mark. Id. at 211. 
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Witteman, and United States v. Johnson—the Supreme Court ruled that Con-
gress’s first attempt at uniform trademark law was unconstitutional because the 
act at issue did not limit that the applied-for trademarks be used in com-
merce.60 Such a limitation was necessary in any trademark legislation because 
Congress’s sole power to regulate trademarks comes from the Commerce 
Clause in the Constitution.61 The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regu-
late activity that both directly and indirectly affects interstate commerce, and 
the heart of trademark is commerce.62 
The Lanham Act codifies modern federal trademark law.63 Representative 
Fritz G. Lanham of the U.S. House of Representatives first proposed the Act in 
1938.64 In 1946, after much tinkering and rewriting, Congress passed the Lan-
ham Act, creating federal trademark registration requirements.65 To obtain fed-
eral registration, an applicant must first file with the USPTO.66 The Act re-
quires that the mark be used “in commerce” to be eligible for trademark pro-
tection by the government.67 Applications for trademarks must meet three basic 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 91–92, 99 (1879) (consolidating three cases in an appeal 
to determine whether Congress had any constitutional authority to regulate trademarks and if so where 
that power rested in the Constitution); Christiansen & Tucker, supra note 4, at 329. 
 61 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96–97. Congress derives its authority to regulate patents and 
copyrights from Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution; because this clause excludes trademarks, Con-
gress instead uses the Commerce Clause to regulate trademarks. Christiansen & Tucker, supra note 4, 
at 329 n.18. 
 62 Christiansen & Tucker, supra note 4, at 329–30. The scope of the Commerce Clause is broad. 
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (holding that the individual intrastate activity of a 
wheat farmer can substantially affect interstate commerce). Cases emerging from the Civil Rights era 
shed light on the broad scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Christiansen & 
Tucker, supra note 4, at 328. In a unanimous decision in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Supreme Court 
found that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 soundly prohibited a local restaurant, Ollie’s BBQ, from dis-
criminating against African Americans because of their race. 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964). Even though 
the restaurant allegedly served no out of state customers, its procurement of produce from out of state 
brought its conduct within the scope of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 294, 296. Decided the same day 
as Katzenbach, in another unanimous decision, the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 
held that public accommodation restrictions prohibiting racial discrimination also applied to private 
motels that serviced out-of-state residents. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).   
 63 Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 
755–56 (2007); Beverly Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act at Fifty—Some History and Comment, 
86 TRADEMARK REP. 442, 442 (1996). 
 64 Pattishall, supra note 63, at 442. 
 65 Id. Federal registration provides better protections than those afforded by traditional common 
law. Tait, supra note 42, at 905. For example, if the mark owner registers the mark with the USPTO 
and is a party to a trademark infringement action, there is a prima facie presumption that the owner 
has an exclusive right to use the mark. Id. After five years, the owner can file for a declaration of 
incontestability, meaning there is a presumption that the mark itself is valid. 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012); 
Tait, supra note 42, at 905. 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).  
 67 Christiansen & Tucker, supra note 4, at 329–30. Initially, the Supreme Court instituted a three-
part test to determine whether the mark owner can use the Lanham Act’s protections. Steele v. Bulova 
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statutory requirements: (1) they must be filed by the owner; (2) they must iden-
tify the type of entity (whether an individual or corporation) applying for the 
trademark and the owner’s citizenship status; and (3) they must establish actual 
or intended use of the trademark in commerce.68 The mark must also not be 
“merely descriptive,” and it must be distinct such that the product or service is 
tied to the mark in the eyes of the consumer.69 If a trademark meets the above 
requirements, the USPTO will register the mark unless it falls within one of 
several restrictions enumerated in § 2(a) of the Act.70 For example, one of 
§ 2(a)’s provisions restricts registration of trademarks if the mark is immoral, 
scandalous, or disparaging.71 Other prohibitions on trademark registration in-
clude whether the trademark is likely to cause confusion with another mark, is 
merely descriptive and not distinctive, or is primarily geographically decep-
tively misdescriptive.72 
Although the mark owner retains common law trademark protections 
even if the USPTO does not approve a trademark, those protections are limited 
in scope.73 Our country allows common law protections for the first use of a 
trademark within a geographic area.74 Common law use protections only re-
main as long as the owner of the mark continues to use it deliberately and does 
                                                                                                                           
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283, 286 (1952). The test is satisfied if (1) the trademark is used “in com-
merce”; (2) the defendant is a U.S. Citizen; and (3) there is no conflict with foreign law. Id. Due to the 
unique jurisdiction questions that the Internet presents, other circuits have eased the requirements of 
the test to encompass otherwise valid marks that did not meet all prongs of the test. Rami S. Yanni & 
Robert Zelnick, The Evolving Law on Application of U.S. Trademark Laws Beyond U.S. Borders, 
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (June 2, 2006), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/40184/Trade
mark/The+Evolving+Law+on+Application+of+US+Trademark+Laws+Beyond+US+Borders [https://
perma.cc/BDE2-GS45].  
 68 15 U.S.C. § 1051. 
 69 Id. § 1052; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 7.  
 70 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (prohibiting registration based on certain characteristics, including 
where the mark is immoral, deceptive, or scandalous). 
 71 Id. 
 72 § 1052(d)–(e). Whether marks are confusingly similar may be determined based on similarity 
of sound, appearance, and meaning. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 4. For 
example, as described in the USPTO’s pamphlet, the marks “T Markey” and “Tee Marquee” are pho-
netically pronounced the same, but they are spelled differently. Id. One example of a merely descrip-
tive mark that would likely be denied a trademark application would be “BICYCLE.” Id. at 8. The 
trademark is too generic to provide any indication of the source of the product. Id. Further, an example 
of a geographically deceptively misdescriptive trademark is one for wine that identifies a country of 
origin that is not the source of the wine in question. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Whereas champagne refers to a 
specific region in France, a California vineyard could not name its wine “Napa Champagne” because it 
would lead consumers to think that the wine came from France when in fact it did not. See Frank J. Prial, 
Wine Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at C4 (detailing the sources of different grape varieties and re-
gions for wine); The Difference Between Sparkling Wine and Champagne, WINE COUNTRY (July 6, 
2015), https://www.winecountry.com/blog/sparkling-wine-vs-champagne/ [https://perma.cc/AEH4-
CNU5] (explaining that champagne only comes from the Champagne region in France).  
 73 Conrad, supra note 8, at 126. 
 74 Id. 
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not abandon it, whereas federally registered trademarks are valid for ten 
years.75 Common law use trademark owners cannot protect themselves against 
infringement unless they notify the public of their common law trademark with 
the symbol “TM.”76 An unregistered trademark user may still enforce exclu-
sive use of the trademark using infringement or unfair competition claims, but 
only if the public had actual notice of the mark’s ownership.77 Arguably the 
greatest advantage of registering a trademark with the USPTO is that registra-
tion confers constructive notice nationwide because the trademark is on a fed-
eral register searchable by anyone.78 In addition, other countries are more like-
ly to recognize registered trademarks as opposed to common law use marks.79 
This is because most countries recognize trademarks under a first-to-file sys-
tem rather than American common law’s first-to-use system.80 For example, in 
1993, basketball star Michael Jordan began using the trademark “JORDAN” 
for his popular Air Jordan sneakers.81 Although Jordan registered the English 
spelling iteration of “JORDAN” with the USPTO, Jordan had only common 
                                                                                                                           
 75 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 29. 
 76 Id. at 11. 
 77 See Mark P. McKenna, The Implications of Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., PATENTLYO 
BLOG (June 19, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/implications-blackhorse-football.html 
[https://perma.cc/YJ4E-HSVM] (describing available remedies for unfair competition, prior to the 
Tam III decision, for the Washington Redskins following the TTAB’s cancellation of its “Redskins” 
trademarks due to its disparaging content). While Tam III moved through the court system, the Wash-
ington Redskins’ appeal of the TTAB’s cancellation of its trademark was stayed. Pro-Football, Inc. v. 
Blackhorse, 709 Fed. App’x 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2018) (appealing Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 
F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015)). This meant that as the appeal was stayed, the Washington Redskins 
had only common law use protections until the reinstatement of their trademarks. Id. Following the 
decision in Tam III, the Redskins’ trademarks were reinstated. Id.  
 78 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1341; see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 9 (detailing 
the free trademark search system TESS, Trademark Electronic Search System, that contains all feder-
ally registered trademarks). 
 79 Conrad, supra note 8, at 126; Ramsey, supra note 49, at 803. Although most countries do not 
recognize common law trademark like the United States does, other nations like Saudi Arabia and the 
United Kingdom have trademark law provisions that echo the immoral, scandalous, and disparaging 
clauses in § 2(a) of the Lanham Act. Ramsey, supra note 49, at 814 (prohibiting registration of trade-
marks in Saudi Arabia of “[a]ny expression, sign or drawing inconsistent with public order or public 
morality” and in the United Kingdom of marks “contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of 
morality”). Further, trademark provisions in China and South Korea more closely mirror the dispar-
agement clause in the Lanham Act. See id. (singling out an offensive trademark in China that “dis-
criminate[s] against any nationality” and in South Korea that “falsely indicates a connection with a 
state, race, ethnic group, public organization, religion or famous deceased person, or which slanders, 
insults or is likely to defame them”). 
 80 Conrad, supra note 8, at 126; Charles R. B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the 
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AIPLA Q. J. 193, 202 (1990). 
 81 Michele Ferrante, Strategies to Avoid Risks Related to Trademark Squatting in China, 107 
TRADEMARK REP. 726, 740 (2017); Gwynn Guilford, A Chinese Sportswear Company Has Trade-
marked Michael Jordan’s Sons’ Names, QUARTZ (Apr. 29, 2013), https://qz.com/79234/michael-
jordan-versus-qiaodan-sports/ [https://perma.cc/A45P-P9UN]. 
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law trademark protections for translations of the Jordan name.82 Capitalizing 
on the vulnerability of Jordan’s common law trademark protections, in 2000, a 
Chinese company registered the trademark “QIAODAN,” which translates to 
Jordan using Chinese characters.83 Unlike the United States, China is a first-to-
file trademark system and Jordan did not file the mark first.84 As a result, Jor-
dan spent years in expensive litigation to cancel the Chinese company’s “QI-
AODAN” trademark.85 Although typically Chinese courts prioritize registra-
tion, common law use had associated the Chinese translation of Jordan’s sur-
name with the celebrity of Michael Jordan.86 Jordan ultimately succeeded in 
cancelling the registration of his surname in 2016.87 Despite this delayed victo-
ry, years spent on litigation could have been easily avoided by federally regis-
tering common translations of the Jordan surname with the USPTO.88 As is 
evident by Jordan’s struggle, federal registration of trademarks provides supe-
rior government protections for enforcement against trademark infringement.89 
The Lanham Act provides the vehicle for bestowing trademark protec-
tions.90 Section 2(a) of the Act prohibits registration of trademarks if they are 
disparaging.91 Although the Lanham Act does not explicitly define when a 
trademark is disparaging, prior to the Tam decision, courts adopted the inter-
pretation of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).92 The TTAB ap-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1; Ferrante, supra note 81, at 741 
(inferring that Jordan has common law use protections to translations of his name). 
 83 Ferrante, supra note 81, at 727, 741; Guilford, supra note 81. The Chinese company engaged in 
the common, albeit notorious, practice of trademark squatting. Ferrante, supra note 81, at 741. Trade-
mark squatting occurs when someone purposefully secures trademark translations of other brand 
names to capitalize on that market share by holding the mark hostage for money or attempting to mis-
lead consumers about the true source of goods or services. Id. at 727. 
 84 Conrad, supra note 8, at 126; Ferrante, supra note 81, at 744–45. 
 85 See Ferrante, supra note 81, at 741–42 (describing Jordan’s lawsuit in 2012 to invalidate Qiao-
dan Sports’ mark registration that obtained a partially favorable ruling in 2016). Jordan’s litigation 
success was limited, however, because the Chinese court only cancelled the trademark application of 
the translation of Jordan’s surname into Chinese characters, not Pinyin characters. Id. at 742. Pinyin is 
the system for translating Chinese characters into the Latin alphabet. ZHAOCHEN GUO ET AL., NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ENGLISH AND CROSS-LINGUAL ENTITY LINKING 5 (2012), https://
tac.nist.gov//publications/2012/participant.papers/ualberta.proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX7Y-
AXB4]. 
 86 Ferrante, supra note 81, at 741–42. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 745. 
 89 Conrad, supra note 8, at 126; Ferrante, supra note 81, at 745. 
 90 Pattishall, supra note 63, at 442. 
 91 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
 92 Conrad, supra note 8, at 111; see TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 18, § 1203.03(b)(i) (de-
termining whether a mark is immoral and scandalous based on if a “substantial composite of the refer-
enced group” would be offended). The TTAB is an administrative body within the USPTO that adju-
dicates issues stemming from the registration of an applicant’s trademark, including appeals, opposi-
tions, and cancellations. About the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
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plied a two-part test to determine if a mark is disparaging by first determining 
the likely meaning of the mark and then identifying whether a “substantial 
composite” of the group implicated by the mark would find it disparaging.93 
The TTAB and federal courts, prior to the ruling in Tam, did not take into 
account the intent of the applicant, such as whether the applicant intended to 
reclaim a derogatory word, rather than use it to disparage.94 The courts only 
considered the examiner’s determination of whether a “substantial composite” 
of the group implicated by the derogatory or offensive word would consider 
the trademark to be derogative.95 The “substantial composite” did not have to 
even be a majority of group members.96 The government justified its re-
                                                                                                                           
OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-regulations/trademark-trial-and-appeal-board [https://
perma.cc/V2MH-R3L9]. 
 93 TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 18, § 1203.03(b)(i). The USPTO test for determining 
whether a mark is disparaging first asks the examiner to consider the “likely meaning” of the mark 
and then to consider whether a “substantial composite of the referenced group” would find the mark 
disparaging. Id. There is no clear definition of what constitutes a “substantial composite.” See id. 
(omitting explicit definition of substantial composite and stating that it does not have to constitute a 
majority of members in the referenced group). Even though the USPTO adopted a two-part test to 
determine whether a clause qualified as disparaging, this test produced varying results in practice. See 
Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1342 n.7 (detailing the USPTO’s rejection of the trademark “HAVE YOU 
HEARD SATAN IS A REPUBLICAN” but approval of “THE DEVIL IS A DEMOCRAT,” which 
arguably is also offensive to a substantial composite of people, namely Democrats); Conrad, supra 
note 8, at 124 (describing the granting of a trademark for “WE RUB YOU”—a play on words pro-
nounced with Korean accents—which debatably is offensive to a substantial composite of Koreans). 
 94 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (noting the band sought to reclaim the derogatory expression 
through its band name); Tushnet, supra note 33, at 37 n.110 (noting the substantial composite test 
focuses on content instead of the intent of the speaker); VerSteeg, supra note 57, at 116 n.28 (noting 
the unusual nature of trademark applicants reclaiming phrases because most “disparaging” trademark 
applications stemmed from groups that wanted to trademark derogatory words for oppressive purpos-
es). “Reclaiming” is the act of altering the narrative of an offensive slur from a source of hardship to a 
source of pride. Todd Anten, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the Reap-
propriation of Slurs into Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 414 (2006). Both 
textual and visual slurs can be reclaimed. Id. at 413 n.169. For example, during World War II, Nazis 
labeled those who identified as LGBTQ+ with a pink triangle. Id. In the years since, this former sym-
bol for hate has transformed into a symbol for LGBTQ+ pride. Id. 
 95 Hsieh, supra note 21, at 6; see TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 18, § 1203.03(b)(i) (failing 
to articulate a definition of what constitutes a “substantial composite”); Tushnet, supra note 33, at 37 
n.110 (noting that the substantial composite test focuses on the content instead of the speaker’s intent). 
The substantial composite need not be a majority. Hsieh, supra note 21, at 6. Simon Tam, the trade-
mark applicant in Tam I and Tam III, criticized the dissonance between the substantial composite and 
majority because it produced unfair and ironic results. See Simon Tam, Opinion, The Slants on the 
Power of Repurposing a Slur, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/
opinion/the-power-of-repurposing-a-slur.html?r=1 [https://perma.cc/L37R-3FLE] (describing the 
“thousands of pages” of evidence and surveys that he presented to the USPTO detailing that over 90% 
of Asian Americans approved of “The Slants” band name which, ironically, the USPTO found dispar-
aging to Asian Americans). 
 96 TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 18, § 1203.03(b)(i); Hsieh, supra note 21, at 6. There are no 
clear lines for what constitutes a substantial composite and the ultimate determination is made at the 
examiner’s discretion. TRADEMARK MANUAL, supra note 18, § 1203.03(b)(i); Hsieh, supra note 21, at 
6. 
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striction on disparaging trademarks because it sought to regulate offensive 
speech and prevent disruptions of commerce that would be caused by such 
disparaging marks.97 In 1964, in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court articulated 
what is now a long-standing principle that discriminatory speech disrupts in-
terstate commerce.98 Further, research studies indicate that marginalized 
groups experience negative psychological and sociological effects when a so-
ciety uses derogatory and offensive imagery.99 Although trademarks prevent 
consumer confusion in the marketplace, the disparaging nature of some marks 
can detrimentally affect commerce, undercutting the benefits of protecting 
trademarks.100 Yet trademarks are undoubtedly speech protected by the First 
Amendment, begging the question of how much the government can restrict 
registering them.101 
Free speech and trademark restriction intersect in more than just the dis-
paraging/offensive clause.102 Although there is limited case law on the inter-
section of trademark law and free speech rights, case precedent indicates Con-
gress can regulate which trademarks it registers.103 Measures Congress can 
regulate include marks that are likely to cause confusion and those that are 
likely to dilute or tarnish the reputation of other established marks.104 In San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, decided by the Su-
preme Court in 1987, the San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) wanted to 
host and organize the “Gay Olympic Games.”105 The U.S. Olympic Committee 
(USOC) sought to enjoin the SFAA from using the term “Olympics” in its sport-
                                                                                                                           
 97 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (citing Tam II, 808 F. 3d at 1379–81 (Reyna, J., dissenting)). 
 98 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); see In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486 (noting Congress’s intention to 
deny federal benefits to scandalous marks because of the public’s distaste for such immoral and scan-
dalous marks). 
 99 Stephanie A. Fryberg et al., Of Warrior Chiefs and Indian Princesses: The Psychological Con-
sequences of American Indian Mascots, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 208, 215–16 (2008); see 
Conrad, supra note 8, at 124 (noting that the disparagement clause can prevent the registration of 
offensive trademarks by the over one hundred white power bands in the country that have names like 
“JEW SLAUGHTER” and “DEFINITE HATE”). 
 100 Tam II, 808 F. 3d at 1379–81 (Reyna, J., dissenting); VerSteeg, supra note 55, at 134. 
 101 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (citing Tam II, 808 F. 3d at 1379–81 (Reyna, J., dissenting)) 
(discussing the extent of available speech restrictions as limited to those that can overcome the burden 
of intermediate scrutiny and assuming that trademarks are speech because the debate is over what kind 
of speech trademarks are). 
 102 See infra notes 103−114 (discussing the impact of trademark restrictions on dilution law). 
 103 See Tushnet, supra note 63, at 748 (describing the history of S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)). S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. presented the first openly homo-
sexual-related question before the Court since 1967. JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUS-
TICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 375–76 (2001). National and worldwide 
sporting events have a troubled history regarding inclusivity towards LGBTQ+ identifying people. 
Eric Anderson, Masculinities and Sexualities in Sport and Physical Cultures: Three Decades of 
Evolving Research, 58 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 565, 565 (2011). 
 104 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012); id. § 1125.  
 105 483 U.S. at 527; Tushnet, supra note 63, at 748. 
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ing event, as “OLYMPICS” was the USOC’s registered trademark.106 Ultimate-
ly, the Court rejected the SFAA’s First Amendment argument that the U.S. 
Olympic Committee could not monopolize the use of the term “Olympic,” 
holding that the Lanham Act allowed the government to regulate confusing 
commercial speech that likely could deceive or mislead consumers.107 
Congress can also regulate speech for trademarks that are likely to dilute 
the reputation of other registered marks.108 A particular form of dilution that 
heavily implicates free speech rights is dilution by tarnishment, wherein a fa-
mous mark is tarnished by association with a similar, unflattering mark, typi-
cally because the tarnishing mark is sexual, obscene, or reflects illegal activi-
ty.109 In 1995, Congress added to trademark protections by enacting the Dilu-
                                                                                                                           
 106 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 527; Murdoch & Price, supra note 103, at 364, 366. 
The San Francisco Arts & Athletics Inc. (SFAA) argued that the U.S. Olympic Committee only 
brought this suit against SFAA for homophobic reasons. Murdoch & Price, supra note 103, at 369. At 
the time of the suit, the “Olympics” mark was in use in other contexts, including the use of “Special 
Olympics” for a popular athletic competition for those with developmental disabilities. Id. 
 107 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 531−35; Tushnet, supra note 63, at 746. Actual decep-
tion is not required to invalidate a trademark because USPTO’s limited resources prevent the office 
from performing a comprehensive study of every single mark and, moreover, doing so would be ad-
ministratively inefficient. Tushnet, supra note 33, at 751 n.80. There has been some criticism of S.F. 
Arts & Athletics, Inc., largely because people do not believe that it is the government’s responsibility 
to protect the public from confusing marks. Id. at 748. Instead, the critics opt for a pure laissez-faire 
form in the marketplace. Id. Additionally, there has been discussion of whether marks may be com-
mercial in nature sometimes and purely expressive at other times. See id. (discussing how the Court’s 
disregard for First Amendment jurisprudence in favor of trademark law fails to address the issue of 
when trademarks are partially useful and partially misleading). In 2002, in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec-
ords, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that deceptive speech should fall 
outside of First Amendment protections entirely because it qualifies as fraud. 296 F.3d 894, 905 (9th 
Cir. 2002). Conversely, in Kasky v. Nike, Inc., a dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia suggested that there should be no available restrictions for commercial speech that is not merely 
deceptive because such speech does not cause any actionable harm to consumers. 45 P.3d 243, 280 
(Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., dissenting). There, the dissent refused to characterize consumers’ disappoint-
ment in their purchase as a recognized harm that the government could protect under a First Amend-
ment analysis. Id. The dissent further argued that restrictions on commercial speech may suffocate the 
marketplace by continuing to advance an arbitrary distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech. Id. at 269. As a result, expressive speech that warrants First Amendment protec-
tion could be restricted. Id. Some U.S. Courts of Appeals, such as the Second Circuit, hold that intent 
to deceive is not required for trademark suits. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor 
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006). In contrast, First Amend-
ment analysis of speech often looks to speaker intent to determine if such speech was done recklessly, 
negligently, or with the knowledge of falsity. Id.; Martin H. Redish, First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 434 
(1971).  
 108 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985–86 
(1996); Ramsey, supra note 49, at 834. 
 109 Jesse A. Hofrichter, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems with 
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1924−25 (2007); Lynda J. 
Oswald, Tarnishment and Blurring Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 36 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 255, 263–64 (1999). Dilution, unlike trademark infringement, does not require a likelihood of 
confusion. Tushnet, supra note 63, at 738. The other dilution cause of action, dilution by blurring, 
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tion Act to protect against dilution by both blurring and tarnishment.110 Then, 
in 2006, Congress clarified legislation around dilution with the Trademark Di-
lution Revision Act by establishing that only likelihood of dilution is needed 
for a claim, rather than evidence of actual dilution.111 After the passage of this 
Act, in 2010, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Kentucky’s permanent injunction against the use of the store name “Victor’s 
Little Secret” for selling adult toys.112 The Sixth Circuit further held that be-
cause of the sexual nature of the association, the use of “Victor’s Little Secret” 
had a high likelihood of tarnishing the positive goodwill connected to the 
“VICTORIA’S SECRET” mark of the famous lingerie brand.113 In light of the 
speech issues raised in Tam, the regulations protecting against disparaging and 
offensive marks, as well as dilution by tarnishment, raise the question of the 
breadth of the government’s power to enforce these restrictions.114 
                                                                                                                           
occurs when a trademark owner suffers harm because his or her trademark loses its distinctiveness. 
Oswald, supra note 109, at 262–63. Sometimes courts conflate the two types of dilution or find that a 
diluting mark implicates both. Id. at 276. For example, in Ringling Brothers v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chev-
rolet, Inc., the Federal Circuit discussed the issue of dilution by blurring. 855 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 
1988). The court affirmed the District Court’s holding that enjoined a used car dealership from using 
the tagline, “The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth” because it blurred the Ringling Bros.’s mark, 
“The Greatest Show on Earth.” Id. Even though the court found there was no likelihood of confusion 
between the circus and the used car dealership, the court concluded Congress had the ability to regu-
late the use of the Ringling Bros.’s registered trademark because overuse of the mark would make it 
lose its unique features in the marketplace. Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 482–83. Thus, the court re-
stricted Chevrolet’s use of the notable tagline. Id. at 485. 
 110 Federal Trademark Dilution Act § 3; Ramsey, supra note 49, at 802, 804 (writing that the 
Lanham Act already included protections against dilution and that the Federal Dilution Act just added 
to this). 
 111 Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2 (overturning the holding in Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (Moseley I) that held actual dilution is required under the Lan-
ham Act). 
 112 605 F.3d 382, 387–90 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moseley II). Congress passed the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act to overrule the first iteration of this case that went up to the Supreme Court in 2003. 
Moseley I, 537 U.S. at 433. There, the Supreme Court ruled that, under the federal law in effect at the 
time, actual evidence of dilution was required to prove tarnishment. Moseley I, 537 U.S. at 433. After 
the ruling, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, “expressly intended to overrule” 
the Court’s earlier decision in Moseley I. 537 U.S. at 433; Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 385. After the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted an injunction in favor of Victoria’s Secret, 
in 2010, Victor and Cathy Moseley changed the name of their shop from “Victor’s Little Secret” to 
“Cathy’s Little Secret.” Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 384. The couple appealed to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit to lift the injunction, but there the court held that even though the stores 
competed in different markets, a negative association existed and thus tarnished the mark of “VIC-
TORIA’S SECRET.” Id. at 390. 
 113 Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 390. 
 114 See, e.g., Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (citing Tam II, 808 F. 3d at 1379–81 (Reyna, J., dissent-
ing)) (discussing the extent of available speech restrictions as limited to those that can overcome the 
burden of intermediate scrutiny); infra notes 251−287 (arguing that likely under a viewpoint discrimi-
nation analysis, rather than first characterizing the trademark speech at issue as commercial speech 
and constitutional, the Court will instead hold that dilution laws are also unconstitutional). 
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B. Using Commercial Speech and Content-Neutral Theories to Determine 
the Boundaries of Speech the Government May Regulate 
When the Supreme Court conducts constitutional review of a law, the 
Court first determines the appropriate level of scrutiny by which to review the 
statute.115 The Court uses tiers of scrutiny in its standard of review ranging 
from strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny to rational basis review.116 For a 
law to withstand strict scrutiny, the government has the burden to identify a 
compelling government interest in implementing the regulation, and further 
that the regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve those ends.117 Under in-
termediate scrutiny review, the government only needs to identify a substantial 
government interest for its regulation that is no broader than necessary to serve 
that interest.118 Lastly, withstanding rational basis review requires only a legit-
imate government interest that is rationally related to the purposes of the regu-
lation.119 Under the First Amendment, noncommercial speech is subject to the 
highest level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny.120 Commercial speech, on the other 
hand, is subject to intermediate scrutiny.121 
The delineation between commercial and noncommercial speech is rooted 
in the basic theory of why speech is regulated in the first place.122 Constitu-
tional law scholars have identified three primary theories of free speech ex-
plaining the government’s need to regulate speech: (1) the marketplace theory 
of ideas, (2) human autonomy and self-fulfillment, and (3) democratic govern-
ance.123 A marketplace theory of ideas envisions regulations similar to the eco-
                                                                                                                           
 115 Tushnet, supra note 63, at 737; see Tait, supra note 42, at 909 (explaining that a commercial 
speech analysis is primary to exploring a content-based versus content-neutral analysis). 
 116 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 105. 
 123 Id. Although a thorough examination of First Amendment jurisprudence is beyond the scope 
of this Note, the following is a brief history of the differences between the competing free speech 
theories that, when taken together, can identify the boundaries of government regulation. See id. The 
marketplace theory of ideas, widely credited to Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis 
Brandeis, envisions the purpose of free speech as the search for the ultimate truth. Id. at 105–06. Alt-
hough a pure marketplace of ideas theory visualizes no regulations or restrictions on speech, Holmes 
and Brandeis endeavored to determine when restrictions were appropriate. Id. Under this theory, both 
speech and counter-speech are allowed in the marketplace. Id. at 106–07. This allows consumers to be 
informed on all perspectives and, over time, to choose the speech they favor. Id. According to this 
ideal, the long arc of history favors truthful speech because untruthful speech will be disfavored in the 
marketplace of ideas. Id. at 109. Applying the marketplace of ideas to trademarks would mean that 
untruthful and disparaging marks eventually would not be profitable and thus would see a diminished 
use in the marketplace. See id. (describing how the marketplace of ideas theory focuses on the effect 
of speech in the marketplace over time). 
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nomic marketplace to prevent monopolies on ideas.124 In contrast, the human 
autonomy and self-fulfillment theory proposes that the government should only 
regulate speech central to the development and expression of one’s identity.125 
The final theory of democratic governance suggests that only political speech 
that advances civic discourse should enjoy the highest level of protection.126 
These theories help identify the boundaries of regulations that the gov-
ernment should impose on speech and the burdens the government must meet 
to justify those regulations.127 Given the substantial imperfections of the au-
tonomy and democratic governance theories, the marketplace of ideas is the 
prevailing theory of speech.128 A pure marketplace of ideas theory does not 
visualize any hierarchy of speech, meaning it does not distinguish speech pro-
tections based on the speaker, disregarding, for example, whether such a 
speaker is an individual or a corporation.129 A more nuanced view of this theo-
                                                                                                                           
The marketplace theory of ideas is an effects-oriented approach to protect speech. Id. at 106–07, 115. 
Similarly, the human autonomy and self-fulfillment theories are also effects-oriented. Id. Whereas the 
marketplace theory of ideas is based upon society finding the ultimate truth by maximizing speech, the 
human autonomy and self-fulfillment theory is focused on individual speakers developing their identi-
ties to their greatest capacities. Id. The human autonomy and self-fulfillment theory protects speech 
that is intertwined with self-expression, such as artistic and literary works. Id. at 115. Critics argue 
this theory provides no guidance on when speech should be regulated, or if there should even be any 
such regulation at all. Id. at 116. According to the critics, if speech is supposed to serve the purpose of 
allowing an individual to express themselves, then any expression—no matter how violent—is an 
expression of individual identity. Id. To that end, the human autonomy and self-fulfillment theory is 
more like a normative value than a theory. See id. at 105 (noting that “[n]o one thinks all speech 
should be protected”). Practically all scholars agree that under any free speech theory, perjury, defa-
mation, conspiracy, fraud, and threats should not be protected. Id. at 105. The human autonomy theory 
is also criticized for failing to provide a test for determining available restrictions when one person’s 
speech infringes on another’s autonomyfor example, hate speech. Id. at 117.  
 The third prevailing theory on free speech is democratic governance, also known as the public 
debate and self-governance theory. Id. at 123. This theory advocates that the purpose of speech is to 
further democratic discussions of politics and civic issues. Id. at 123−24. Leading scholar Alexander 
Meiklejohn advanced this theory using a town hall metaphor. Id. at 124. At a town hall, people speak 
in turn and use an equal allocation of time in order to mitigate the fear of certain voices drowning out 
others. See id. (positing that everyone speaks in turn at a town hall meeting because unlimited chatter 
would prevent productivity). Despite receiving support from the Supreme Court, the main criticism of 
the democratic governance theory is that, if political speech is protected for the purposes of promoting 
democracy, non-political speech like literary and artistic works fails to be protected. Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“The Free Speech Clause exists principally to protect 
discourse on public matters.”); GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 125. 
 124 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 113. 
 125 Id. at 115. 
 126 Id. at 124. 
 127 Id. at 105. 
 128 Id. at 108. 
 129 Id. at 112 (arguing the Supreme Court failed to use a nuanced view of the marketplace theory 
in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)). Citizens United involved an injunction request 
to prevent the Federal Election Commission (FEC) from enforcing its regulation to limit the amount 
of corporate and individual campaign financing for a film with a negative slant on then-Senator Hilla-
ry Clinton’s bid for the presidency. 558 U.S. at 319−20. Citizens United, the organization promoting 
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ry illustrates that, like the analogy of the economic marketplace, the govern-
ment may regulate speech to correct market defects, such as untruthful or 
fraudulent speech that prevents informed consumer choice in the market-
place.130 
From this nuanced marketplace of ideas theory emerged a distinction be-
tween commercial speech and non-commercial speech.131 The common law 
has not identified concrete boundaries for when speech is commercial versus 
non-commercial.132 The primary distinction between the two is that commer-
cial speech relates to a business transaction, whereas non-commercial speech 
does not.133 Any restriction on non-commercial speech, including individual 
speech, is subject to strict scrutiny.134 Thus, to uphold a restriction on non-
commercial speech, the government has the burden of identifying its compel-
                                                                                                                           
and distributing the film, argued that the FEC’s campaign finance regulation violated its First 
Amendment rights because campaign funding is an expression of speech and thus cannot be limited. 
Id. at 336−37. In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that corporate campaign funding should not 
receive fewer protections than individuals—thus, campaign funding should not be limited based on 
the speaker. Id. at 365. Differing from Citizens United’s position, the Court held that FEC disclosure 
requirements on campaign funding were constitutional due to the government interest in informing the 
public. Id. at 371.  
 130 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 106−07, 113. The Court could have decided Citizens United a 
different way and upheld Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). GREEN-
FIELD, supra note 16, at 113. In Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan state law prohibiting corpora-
tions from using treasury finances for independent expenditures to political campaigns. 494 U.S. at 
668–69. Nonetheless, in Citizens United, the Court, without any nuance, extended its holding in Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), by holding that a cap on expenditures for individuals to political cam-
paigns violated free speech and thus was unconstitutional. GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 123. 
 131 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court identified for the first time that commercial 
speech deserves protection after pharmacists successfully challenged a Virginia state law that prohib-
ited the advertisement of prescription drug prices. Id. at 749−50, 770. The Court noted that its ruling 
did not mean that there should be an absence of any regulation on such speech. Id. at 770. Prior to this 
ruling, it was not clear whether commercial speech enjoyed any First Amendment protections. Id. at 
755. Since this holding, subsequent decisions have held that the government may regulate truthful 
commercial speech if it is deceptive or misleading to maintain a free flow of commerce. Tushnet, 
supra note 33, at 739–40. 
 132 See Conrad, supra note 8, at 142 (arguing the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial should be abolished); see also Tushnet, supra note 33, at 382 (describing the importance 
of long-standing precedent for identifying commercial versus non-commercial speech and that without 
this distinction trademark law as a whole begins to fall apart). But see Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–
64 (creating a test to determine the difference between commercial and non-commercial speech but 
failing to clarify the boundaries of such speech). The case law has defined commercial speech as 
speech that proposes a commercial transaction. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–68; Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United 
States, 620 F.3d 81, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2010) (limiting commercial speech to speech that “does no more” 
than propose a commercial transaction); Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 112 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(expanding the scope of commercial speech beyond speech that “does no more” than propose a com-
mercial transaction). 
 133 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. 
 134 Ned Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2331, 2361 
(2018). 
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ling interest and proving that its regulation was narrowly tailored to achieve 
those ends.135 
In contrast, commercial speech need not withstand the same strict scruti-
ny as non-commercial speech.136 Although the Supreme Court declared in 
1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, that commercial speech warranted First Amendment protection, it was 
not until four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, that the Court developed a test for determining the con-
stitutionality of commercial speech restrictions.137 In Central Hudson, the 
Court held that commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny.138 Alt-
hough the majority did not expressly hold that commercial speech is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny, the concurrence identified the majority’s holding as in-
stituting an intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech and the Court 
subsequently agreed in later cases.139 
The first point of inquiry in assessing commercial speech is whether the 
speech relates to lawful activity and is not deceptive.140 After this threshold 
test, the Court conducts a three-pronged analysis: asking (1) whether the gov-
ernment has a substantial interest; (2) whether the restriction is directly and 
materially related to that interest; and (3) whether the regulation is no more 
restrictive than reasonably necessary to achieve such interest.141 If these ques-
tions are answered affirmatively, then the speech will survive constitutional 
analysis.142 Given the more lax standard of review, as a general principle, a 
commercial speech regulation is more likely to be found constitutional than a 
non-commercial speech regulation.143 
Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its progeny describe 
Congress’s ability to regulate such commercial speech, that power is not abso-
lute.144 The degree to which Congress must justify its regulation depends on 
                                                                                                                           
 135 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137. 
 136 VerSteeg, supra note 57, at 121. 
 137 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. In Central Hud-
son, the Court held the New York law that prohibited public utilities from promoting electricity use 
violated commercial speech concerns under the First Amendment. 447 U.S. at 571. 
 138 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.  
 139 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (referring to the intermediate scrutiny test 
for commercial speech established in Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563); Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 
515 U.S. 618, 623−24 (1995) (same); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(characterizing the majority’s analysis of commercial speech as “intermediate scrutiny”). 
 140 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (majority opinion). 
 141 Id.; GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137. 
 142 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137. 
 143 GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137; see VerSteeg, supra note 57, at 121 (detailing the “more 
rigorous” standard of strict scrutiny compared to the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny). 
 144 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.at 564 (limiting Congress’s power to regulate commercial speech 
based on a four-part test); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 778−79 (restricting Congress’s 
power over commercial speech because commercial speech is not wholly outside the ambit of First 
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whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral, although where to 
draw the line is not always clear.145 Broadly speaking, content-based re-
strictions are those that regulate the subject matter of the speech at issue.146 In 
contrast, content-neutral restrictions do not regulate the subject matter of the 
speech; rather, they regulate the circumstances of the production of speech.147 
Content-based regulations receive strict scrutiny review.148 Although Congress 
may regulate speech harmful to children, Congress must narrowly tailor any 
such regulation while also being careful not to engage in viewpoint discrimina-
tion, for example, by banning certain words that would reveal viewpoints that it 
finds objectionable.149 In contrast, content-neutral restrictions do not implicate 
the content of speech, and thus such regulations only require intermediate scruti-
ny.150 Content-neutral restrictions on both commercial and non-commercial 
speech are subject to more lenient intermediate scrutiny.151 Content-based re-
strictions on commercial speech are not always subject to strict scrutiny analysis; 
because of the compelling government interest in regulating the commercial na-
ture of the speech, the Court can choose to view a content-based commercial 
speech restriction under the intermediate scrutiny lens that it affords commercial 
speech.152 Thus, the Court in Tam may have differently determined the constitu-
tionality of the disparagement clause’s restriction on trademark speech if the 
Court had first categorized the type of speech that was implicated.153 
                                                                                                                           
Amendment protection); see, e.g., Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 
2007 YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 169, 171−72, https://digitalcommons.law.yale.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5649&context=fss_papers [https://perma.cc/W85T-6WXL] (detailing 
the necessity of common-place regulations such as legal malpractice that are arguably viewpoint dis-
crimination-based because such regulations prohibit unprofessional conduct); Tait, supra note 42, at 
913–15 (reasoning that, in cases where the government seeks to prohibit viewership by children, the 
regulation must be substantially related to address the concern for children, while not unduly sup-
pressing adult access to such information).  
 145 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint 
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 619 (2003). 
 146 Id. at 608 n.98. 
 147 Id. at 598. 
 148 Id.; see Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (finding viewpoint discrimination after applying strict 
scrutiny analysis for content-based restriction). 
 149 Tait, supra note 42, at 915. 
 150 Jacobs, supra note 145, at 915. The line between content-neutral and content-based is not a 
clear boundary. Id. The simplistic distinction between the two is that content-neutral regulations re-
strict speech without regard to the expression at issue, whereas content-based restrictions prohibit 
speech based on the expression at issue. Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1377. 
 153 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1763–64 (shortcutting the commercial speech analysis inquiry and 
addressing the constitutionality of the disparagement clause based on viewpoint discrimination). 
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C. The Evolution of Matal v. Tam and the Court’s Dodged Question of 
Whether Trademarks Are Commercial Speech 
In the recent Supreme Court case Matal v. Tam, the Court left open the 
question of whether trademarks constitute commercial speech.154 Instead the 
Court decided the case on alternative grounds by finding that the disparage-
ment clause of § 2(a) of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional because it unlaw-
fully allows the government to engage in viewpoint discrimination.155 Still, the 
facts of the case and the open question left by the Court provide a fertile 
ground for discussion on the implications of Tam’s holding and the future of 
cases at the intersection of trademark and constitutional law.156 
The journey of Tam to the Supreme Court began when Simon Tam ap-
plied to register the trademark for his band name, “The Slants,” in 2011.157 The 
Slants were a rock band comprised of Asian Americans, including Tam.158 The 
band pursued registration for its name because record labels are generally re-
luctant to sign a group that does not have a trademarked name to mitigate any 
future suits against trademark infringement by another party.159 Tam said the 
band’s name was a reclamation of the group members’ marginalized histories, 
as well as an allusion to the band’s “slant” on social justice issues emphasizing 
their Asian-American identities.160 Despite Tam’s reclamation argument, the 
USPTO rejected its application under the disparagement clause of the Lanham 
Act.161 The examiner reasoned that the band’s name was disparaging because it 
implicated the stereotype of many Asians’ and Asian Americans’ “slanty” 
eyes.162 Tam subsequently appealed the decision of the USPTO to the 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Id.; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (detailing the scholarly debate on the crippling 
fate of the Lanham Act should more portions of it be held unconstitutional under strict scrutiny). 
 155 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1763–64. 
 156 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing In re Brunetti, which holds that the 
immoral and scandalous clauses of the Lanham Act are unconstitutional). For example, one scholar 
discusses whether the Tam III decision implicates the scandalous clause of the Lanham Act and con-
cludes that the scandalous clause is likely constitutional. Snow, supra note 134, at 2364. He argues 
that viewpoint discrimination concerns would not affect the scandalous clause because it is not so 
much the viewpoint of the offense that is of principal concern, but rather the visibility of vulgarity and 
explicit trademarks in commerce. Id. at 2368. Notably, he refrains from using a strict scrutiny frame-
work and instead favors using a limited public framework. See id. at 2364 (arguing this theory’s supe-
riority over a commercial speech framework because of trademarks’ applicability to a limited public 
forum where the government creates areas to regulate private speech). A limited public forum is a 
government-created space for the expression of speech where the government is authorized to create 
reasonable restrictions on what kinds of speech receive the benefits of using the forum. Id. 
 157 THE SLANTS, Registration No. 5,332,283. 
 158 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 159 Hsieh, supra note 21, at 5. 
 160 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1764. 
 161 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1764. 
 162 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1754. 
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TTAB.163 The TTAB affirmed the USPTO’s decision on the same grounds and 
Tam appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.164 
The Federal Circuit had a differing view of the disparagement clause from 
the USPTO and the TTAB, paving the way for the Supreme Court’s analy-
sis.165 A three-judge panel initially affirmed the TTAB, holding that Tam’s 
band name was disparaging.166 The panel further held that the disparagement 
clause was not an unconstitutional restriction because Tam was not totally 
barred from using the mark, as it was still valid under common law.167 Despite 
this, Judge Kimberly A. Moore wrote separately from her opinion, calling into 
question the constitutionality of the disparagement clause.168 This led the Fed-
eral Circuit to reconsider the case.169 
In the subsequent en banc ruling, the Federal Circuit reversed the holding 
of the TTAB and declared the disparagement clause unconstitutional because it 
imposed the government’s viewpoint on the permissibility of speech.170 This 
time penning the majority opinion, Judge Moore reasoned that, regardless of 
whether strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny applied, the disparagement clause 
was unconstitutional because the government had put forth no legitimate interest 
to support its restriction.171 Although the majority opinion implied that trade-
marks contain both commercial and non-commercial elements, it did not explic-
itly address whether trademarks are commercial speech.172 In contrast, Judge 
Jimmie V. Reyna, dissenting, explicitly argued that “[t]rademarks are commer-
cial speech,” requiring the court to analyze under the intermediate scrutiny test 
established in Central Hudson.173 Judge Reyna further argued that the govern-
ment had a legitimate interest in protecting commerce from disruptions caused 
by disparaging trademarks, making the disparagement clause of the Lanham 
Act constitutional.174 
                                                                                                                           
 163 Id.; In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1306 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
 164 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1754; Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1357–58; In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1312–
13. 
 165 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1754; Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1357–58. 
 166 In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 571–72 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Tam I), overruled by In re Tam, 108 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (T.T.A.B. 2013); Conrad, supra note 8, at 99. 
 167 Tam I, 785 F.3d at 571–72. 
 168 Id. at 573 (Moore, J., additional views). 
 169 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1357–58; see Conrad, supra note 8, at 101 (providing a detailed summary 
of the journey of the Tam case through the court system). 
 170 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1357–58. 
 171 Id. at 1357. Since the government put forth no legitimate interest, the regulation could not 
even satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Id. 
 172 Conrad, supra note 8, at 102; see Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1328 (finding that under both a commer-
cial speech analysis and a non-commercial speech analysis, the disparagement clause is unconstitu-
tional). 
 173 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 174 Id. 
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Following the Federal Circuit’s ruling, the government appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision.175 
In its petition for certiorari, the government asked the Court to consider, first, 
whether trademarks constitute government speech and therefore bypass any 
First Amendment concerns; second, whether trademarks represent a govern-
ment subsidy; and third, whether trademarks are commercial speech.176 
The Court chose to extensively address the first and second issues but only 
cursorily answer the third.177 Similar to the lower court, Justice Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr., who penned the majority opinion, reasoned that, regardless of whether strict 
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny applied, the disparagement clause could sur-
vive neither.178 The Court held that the disparagement clause was not narrowly 
drawn enough for any governmental interest to be substantially related to the 
restriction at issue, and it therefore could not survive even intermediate scruti-
ny.179 Moreover, the disparagement clause permitted viewpoint discrimination, 
and viewpoint discrimination must survive strict scrutiny to be permissible.180 
This is because the breadth of the disparagement clause allows the government 
to engage in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when deciding which 
trademarks to register.181 As the viewpoint discrimination issue was disposi-
tive, the Court declined to address whether trademarks constitute commercial 
speech.182 The Court ultimately acknowledged that, due to a lack of a uniform 
                                                                                                                           
 175 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1744. Only eight justices participated in the decision, because Justice 
Gorsuch was not seated at the time. Id. 
 176 Id. at 1757. 
 177 Id. at 1764; see Conrad, supra note 8, at 113 (acknowledging that a lot of time at oral argu-
ment was spent on the government speech issue that was already rejected at the lower court level). It 
is likely that the government chose to still argue trademarks constitute government speech because of 
this argument’s success in the Washington Redskins case, which the court had stayed pending the 
appeal of Tam I. See Pro-Football, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d at 452 (finding for the government’s claim 
that trademarks constituted government speech). In Tam III, the government tried to argue that trade-
marks are government speech because the government registers them and provides benefits to the 
owners of such federally registered marks. 137 S. Ct. at 1757. The Supreme Court rejected the gov-
ernment’s argument, reasoning that (1) trademarks are created by individuals and not the government, 
and (2) registration of a trademark does not represent approval by the government. Id. at 1758. Fur-
ther, the majority rejected the government’s previously unraised argument that trademarks are a gov-
ernment subsidy because applicants received minimal benefits in connection with the application fee 
structure. Id. at 1761–62. Justice Clarence Thomas, in his concurrence, thought that the majority 
should not have addressed the issue, because the parties had not raised the issue in earlier proceedings. 
Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). Still, the Court addressed the merits of the argument by holding 
that trademarks are not government speech. Id. at 1763 (majority opinion). 
 178 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1763–64. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.; see Jacobs, supra note 145, at 596–97 (discussing the complicated jurisprudence on the 
intersection of the viewpoint discrimination and content-neutral doctrines). 
 181 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1763–65. 
 182 Id. at 1764. 
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standard for identifying a disparaging mark, the clause was unconstitutional 
under a Central Hudson analysis.183 
The Tam concurrences addressed commercial speech concerns related to 
trademarks in more detail, although both concurring Justices declined to ad-
dress the essential question of whether trademarks are commercial speech.184 
In Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s concurrence, he argued that viewpoint dis-
crimination was per se unconstitutional because the government could only 
regulate specific forms of speech, such as fraud, conspiracy, threats, defama-
tion, and perjury.185 The government’s restriction on prohibiting offensive and 
derogatory trademark content did not fit into any of those categories.186 Justice 
Kennedy reasoned that, regardless of whether trademarks were commercial 
speech, if the regulation implicated viewpoint discrimination, it would be per 
se unconstitutional.187 Justice Clarence Thomas went even further in his con-
currence, advocating for eliminating the tiered free speech analysis from Cen-
tral Hudson and instead analyzing all commercial speech under a strict scruti-
ny lens.188 The Court’s majority opinion ultimately struck down the dispar-
agement clause and left open the question of the status of the remaining § 2(a) 
requirements restricting immoral and scandalous trademarks.189 
II. HOW COURTS VIEW THE INTERSECTION OF TRADEMARKS  
AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Trademarks have an inextricable connection to commerce.190 But despite 
this connection, there is no dispute that some trademarks contain some non-
commercial elements.191 As the band in the Tam decision articulated, they 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See id. at 1763–64 n.17 (concluding that an open question remains as to whether the Central 
Hudson test is appropriate for addressing free speech concerns for commercial speech). But see id. at 
1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (dismissing the Central Hudson test when such speech like that at 
issue in Tam III is political in nature); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (desiring to completely 
eliminate the Central Hudson test). 
 184 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765−69; Conrad, supra note 8, at 119. 
 185 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 1767. 
 188 Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas’s concurrence in Tam III is not the first time he 
criticized Central Hudson and proposed eliminating the test it established. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 189 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (addressing narrowly § 2(a) of the Lanham Act pertaining to 
the disparagement clause and refraining from implicating the immoral and scandalous clauses); infra 
note 254 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 2019 case Brunetti where the question presented asks 
whether the immoral and scandalous clauses are unconstitutional). 
 190 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (enacting legislation pursuant to Congress’s commerce power 
under Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879). 
 191 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1754 (2017) (Tam III) (describing the arguments that 
commercial speech can contain both commercial and non-commercial elements); In re Tam, 808 F.3d 
1321, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Tam II) (Reyna, J., dissenting) (same). 
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sought to use their trademark, “The Slants,” as a form of political and social 
activism.192 The Court has struggled over the years with balancing the interpre-
tation of these commercial and non-commercial speech elements in trademark 
registrations.193 As a result, there is confusion among courts over the appropri-
ate interpretation of the intersection between trademarks and commercial 
speech.194 This Part addresses this jurisprudential discrepancy.195 Section A of 
this Part discusses the interpretation of trademarks as commercial speech.196 
Section B analyzes the argument for dismissing the distinction between com-
mercial and non-commercial speech and instead viewing trademarks under a 
strict scrutiny lens.197 
A. The Case for Trademarks as Commercial Speech 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Tam, the Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York test had largely controlled the 
regulation of trademarks.198 The Central Hudson test guides the constitution-
                                                                                                                           
 192 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 193 See id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that where there are commercial and non-
commercial speech elements the distinction should cease to exist and all speech should be viewed 
under the same strict scrutiny analysis); Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (advocating 
that when there are commercial and non-commercial speech elements, the commercial elements are 
the overriding concerns for the characterization of trademarks as commercial speech); Bad Frog 
Brewery v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the non-commercial 
speech elements of a trade name do not outweigh the characterization of the trade name as commercial 
speech).  
 194 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1754 (failing to address whether trademarks are commercial 
speech); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (hint-
ing at eliminating the intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech and replacing it with a 
strict scrutiny standard); Bad Frog Brewery, 134 F.3d at 96 (recognizing that commercial speech 
includes trade names). 
 195 See infra notes 198–250 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments in favor of trade-
marks as commercial speech and arguments in favor of trademarks as non-commercial speech). 
 196 See infra notes 198–226 and accompanying text (presenting the case for trademarks as com-
mercial speech). 
 197 See infra notes 227–250 and accompanying text (demonstrating the case for trademarks as 
non-commercial speech). An analysis of the “hybrid” approach, which would require the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) to make determinations of where trademarks are sometimes commer-
cial speech and are sometimes not is beyond the scope of this Note. Further, it is likely beyond the 
scope of the USPTO’s resources to determine the extent of whether a given trademark is commercial 
or non-commercial because of the finite resources of the office. See Tushnet, supra note 63, at 751 
n.80. (discussing the USPTO’s scarce resources). No trademark is purely non-commercial because of 
its inherent connection to commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (requiring that the mark be used “in com-
merce” to obtain trademark registration). 
 198 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (addressing the Central Hudson test but then refraining from 
engaging in meaningful discussion of the inquiry); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980) (providing the test); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial In-
terest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 153 
(2005) (indicating the Court’s use of the Central Hudson test for commercial speech regulations, such 
as trademark restrictions). Even though there has been criticism of the Central Hudson test, the Su-
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ality of commercial speech by reasoning that commercial speech is easier to 
regulate because its distribution is more “easily verifiable” and “durable” than 
non-commercial speech, thus withstanding more regulation.199 It is still an un-
answered question as to which of these analyses applies to trademarks.200 Sev-
eral majority opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals have explicitly character-
ized trademarks as commercial speech.201 For example, in 1997 in Bad Frog 
Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit classified a beer label with a cartoon frog making a vulgar 
gesture as commercial speech.202 
Some courts have also viewed trademarks that convey product infor-
mation as commercial speech.203 The Supreme Court has previously implied 
that trademarks are always commercial speech by rationalizing that the pur-
pose of a trademark is to “propos[e] a commercial transaction.”204 In 1983, the 
Court in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. recognized that, even though 
commercial and public interest elements of speech are often intertwined, the 
overriding speech elements that are commercial necessitate that the speech 
should receive intermediate scrutiny.205 To determine whether speech is com-
                                                                                                                           
preme Court has not explicitly overruled it. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 
(2001) (admitting in the majority opinion that several members of the Court express doubts about the 
applicability of Central Hudson). 
 199 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561, 568; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). Historically, commercial speech received no First Amend-
ment protection. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). It was not until Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council that commercial speech began to receive 
First Amendment protections. 425 U.S. at 770. 
 200 See infra notes 201–250 and accompanying text (demonstrating the different characterizations 
of trademarks as commercial or non-commercial speech). 
 201 See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, 134 F.3d at 101 (characterizing the cartoon on the label of a beer 
bottle as a form of commercial speech); Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 
(6th Cir. 1981) (classifying Sambo’s trademark for its restaurant name as commercial speech because 
it identified the quality and reputation of the establishment to consumers). 
 202 Bad Frog Brewery, 134 F.3d at 101. Even under the analysis of intermediate scrutiny, the 
regulation at issue did not meet the government’s burden to identify a compelling interest that was 
reasonably tailored to that interest. Id. at 98–100. The interest of protecting kids was not directly ad-
vanced by the regulation because the beer bottle label was primarily distributed in establishments 
where children did not have access to the material. Id. at 100. This is an example of how the govern-
ment’s power to regulate is not absolute even when trademarks are classified as commercial speech. 
See id. (describing an instance where a regulation was invalid under a commercial speech analysis). 
 203 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 7, 13 (1979) (acknowledging that the trademark for the 
Texas Optometry Board conveyed useful product information about the composition of its members, 
but holding that the government may prohibit trademarks that are deceptive even if the product infor-
mation contained in them is truthful). 
 204 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (asserting that the genus of commercial speech proposes a 
commercial transaction); Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11 (characterizing trade names in connection with a 
particular business as “a form of commercial speech and nothing more”). 
 205 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983); see Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562, n.5 (acknowledging that speech 
cannot transform outside the commercial speech realm simply by adding a political element to it); 
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mercial, the Court developed the three-factor Bolger test, which considers 
whether (1) the speech constitutes advertising; (2) the speech refers to a specif-
ic product; and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation.206 Although not all 
factors are required for speech to be considered commercial, and no factor is 
necessarily more determinative than the others, trademarks arguably answer all 
the Bolger factors’ questions in the affirmative.207 
In the Matal v. Tam decision at the Federal Circuit level, Judge Reyna dis-
sented after analyzing the case law and its characterization of trademarks as 
commercial speech.208 He used the Bolger framework and argued that, despite 
Tam’s band name containing political and non-commercial elements, the over-
all speech, when taken as a whole, was commercial.209 According to Judge 
Reyna, trademarks satisfy the first factor of the Bolger test because marks like 
“THE SLANTS” advertise the source of the product.210 The mark also refers to 
a specific product—in the Tam case, Tam’s band, “THE SLANTS.”211 Lastly, 
due to the tie-in of federal registration of trademarks with interstate commerce, 
Tam has an economic motivation for his speech.212 Because federal registration 
provides trademarks with exclusive use rights, trademark law allows the 
trademark owner to prevent infringement and profit off speech.213 As trade-
marks satisfy all three factors of the Bolger test, Judge Reyna concluded that 
trademarks are commercial speech.214 
In addition, Judge Reyna focused on the purpose of the Lanham Act as a 
whole in promoting “the orderly flow of commerce.”215 This, he reasoned, 
aligns with the purpose of the disparagement clause.216 Drawing back on the 
historic Civil Rights cases, like Katzenbach v. McClung, Judge Reyna argued 
                                                                                                                           
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (recognizing that public messages concerning issues of 
public importance can also be commercial in nature). 
 206 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 (recognizing that speech must be taken as a whole); Pomeranz & Adler, 
supra note 31, at 41. 
 207 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 (describing the factors that commercial speech (1) is related to 
advertising, (2) is about a specific product, and (3) has economic motivation); Pomeranz & Adler, 
supra note 31, at 41 (characterizing the factors listed in Bolger as a test created by the Court); infra 
notes 208−214 and accompanying text (detailing how trademarks meet each factor of the Bolger test). 
 208 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 209 See id. (focusing on the importance of the speech taken together as a whole that is central to 
the Bolger analysis). 
 210 Id. at 1377. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. at 1377, 1381. 
 214 Id. at 1378. 
 215 Id. at 1376; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (regulating trademarks and promoting the orderly 
flow of commerce). 
 216 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting); see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (noting the dispar-
agement clause prevents the registration of marks that denigrate a substantial composite of the refer-
enced group).  
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that disparagement and discrimination against minorities in particular inter-
rupts the free flow of commerce, thus interrupting interstate commerce that 
Congress has the power to regulate.217 The power to regulate interstate com-
merce is a substantial government interest satisfying the first prong of interme-
diate scrutiny, begging only the question of whether the trademark regulation 
is narrowly drawn.218 Judge Reyna questioned that if the power to regulate 
commerce did not satisfy a substantial government interest, then the govern-
ment would have no power to register trademarks at all, as trademark registra-
tion inherently involves prohibiting speech that is infringing on registered 
marks.219 
Judge Reyna also advanced the position that the Lanham Act’s restriction 
on disparaging speech was content-neutral, not content-based.220 A restriction 
that facially may appear content-based may still meet content-neutral require-
ments if the purpose of the regulation is not to suppress speech, but to prevent 
the harmful secondary effects of the speech that can be mitigated by regulating 
the speech’s time, place, or manner.221 This is known as the secondary effects 
doctrine.222 The secondary effects doctrine has been advanced in cases affirm-
ing the constitutionality of bans against the content of expression, including 
                                                                                                                           
 217 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting); see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 
299–300 (1964) (describing how discriminatory actions, even absent conduct, can cause disruptions in 
the marketplace that are a prime government concern); supra note 62 (providing background infor-
mation on the Civil Rights cases affecting interstate commerce). 
 218 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 219 Id. 
 220 See id. (“[T]he government has never stated that the purpose of § 2(a) is to suppress speech. 
Only the Majority has advanced this rationale . . . .”). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 1378–79. The secondary effects doctrine was first adopted to regulate adult entertain-
ment in zoning plans. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976). In Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court upheld Detroit’s zoning ordinance that restricted the devel-
opment of an adult entertainment movie business near certain residential areas. Id. at 72–73. The 
Court held that the ordinance was not intended to suppress the offensive speech, but rather to combat 
the “secondary effect” of neighborhood deterioration and increased crime rates that accompany movie 
theaters displaying adult entertainment. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34. In 1986, in City of Renton v. Play-
time Theaters, Inc., the Court reiterated the secondary effects. 475 U.S. 41, 47, 50 (1986). Similar to 
Young, at issue in City of Renton was another zoning ordinance that facially appeared to be content-
based; the Court, however, upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance restricting adult business in 
certain areas because of the secondary effects of adult businesses in places like churches, parks, and 
schools. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46; Young, 427 U.S. at 71. Then, in 1991, Justice David Souter’s 
concurrence in Barnes v. GlenTheatre, Inc. claimed that the scope of the secondary effects doctrine 
extended beyond zoning ordinances to include a state law that regulated nude expression in strip 
clubs. 501 U.S. 560, 584 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). In 2000, in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the 
Court articulated the rationale of Justice Souter’s concurrence in Barnes by extending the secondary 
effects doctrine to uphold a ban on fully-nude dancing. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 
297 (2000) (noting the Court’s adoption of Justice Souter’s rationale despite Justice Souter’s disavow-
al of his Barnes concurrence with his part concurrence and part dissent in City of Erie). 
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upholding a ban on fully nude dancing.223 In City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., decid-
ed by the Supreme Court in 2000, the regulation at issue restricted certain 
types of expression; the overriding purpose of the regulation, however, was 
promoting the secondary effects of public health, safety, and welfare.224 Even 
if the regulation implicates content, the Court views such speech as content-
neutral when the primary purpose is to address the secondary effects of such 
speech.225 In line with Judge Reyna’s view, the International Trademark Asso-
ciation, a global organization to promote and understand trademark law, also 
advocates for trademarks as commercial speech because of the intrinsic nature 
of trademarks, in that they help consumers identify the source of products and 
services in the marketplace.226 
B. The Case for Trademarks as Non-Commercial Speech 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly overrule the Central 
Hudson test, several justices have expressed doubt as to the continued relevance 
of the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech.227 In its 
place, these justices seem to favor a heightened scrutiny for commercial speech, 
equal to a strict scrutiny standard like that of non-commercial speech.228 For 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 283, 297 (upholding a city law prohibiting persons from know-
ingly or intentionally appearing nude in public). 
 224 Id. at 279. An adult business featuring erotic dancing challenged the city ordinance for violat-
ing freedom of expression under the First Amendment. Id. at 282–83. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania held that the city’s restriction was content-based and that it failed to meet the higher burden of 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 286. The Supreme Court instead focused on the secondary effects doctrine and 
emphasized that the minimal restriction furthered the government interest of public health and safety. 
Id. at 282. 
 225 Id. at 282–83. The Court found it increasingly important to address the issue of the applicabil-
ity of the secondary effects doctrine despite the club owner’s argument that the issue was moot. See 
id. at 287 (denying the erotic club owner’s motion to dismiss the case based on the corporation ceas-
ing operations at the location at issue and granting certiorari due to the club’s continued incorporation 
in the state). 
 226 Brief for the International Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
1, 14, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293); see Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1378–79 (Reyna, J., 
dissenting) (arguing trademarks meet all the requirements for commercial speech protections). 
 227 See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554–55 (acknowledging that some members of the 
Court question the continued use of the Central Hudson test); see, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating 
for the dismissal of the Central test in an injunctive relief request case involving gambling advertise-
ments); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, JJ., joint opinion) (finding 
the application of the Central Hudson test to be incompatible with justifying a total ban on certain 
types of commercial speech); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring) (question-
ing the continued use of the Central Hudson test). 
 228 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (desiring to eliminate completely the 
Central Hudson test); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc., 527 U.S. at 197 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (favoring heightened scrutiny because any asserted government interest in restricting 
advertisements for gambling is per se illegitimate); 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., 
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example, in the 1996 Supreme Court case, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
which did not have a majority, the concurrences suggest an end to the commer-
cial speech doctrine.229 Even Justice John Paul Stevens’s plurality opinion ar-
gued that while the commercial speech doctrine is necessary for protecting 
consumers against misleading and deceptive information, absent deception, the 
Court should not depart from the heightened strict scrutiny standard of the 
First Amendment enjoyed by individuals.230 In a separate concurrence, Justice 
Antonin Scalia supported Justice Thomas’s proposition to toss out any distinc-
tion between commercial and non-commercial speech altogether.231 Justice 
Scalia, a well-known textualist, found no view outside of public policy to sup-
port the current distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
speech.232 Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Tam, again reiterated his de-
sire to subject all speech regulations, commercial or otherwise, to a strict scru-
tiny analysis.233 Further, in other cases, judges argued that the appropriate reg-
ulation for offensive or disparaging trademarks was not censorship from gov-
ernment regulation, but rather free range in the marketplace.234 Consumer de-
mand would determine the success of a so-called “offensive” trademark, with 
                                                                                                                           
concurring) (hinting at the need for the elimination of the Central Hudson test in favor of heightened 
scrutiny). 
 229 See 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring) (hinting at replacing the intermediate scrutiny 
standard for commercial speech with a strict scrutiny standard); id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing there is no justification for any distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech). 
In 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court held unconstitutional a Rhode Island state ban on the 
display of alcohol prices outside an establishment selling liquor. Id. at 489–90, 516. The Court em-
phasized that such a ban infringes on a seller’s freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Id. at 
516. The state of Rhode Island failed to establish how its restriction furthered the government purpose 
of protecting consumers against commercial harms. Id. at 502. Given this lack of evidence from the 
state, the Court prioritized the public interest in consumer information in the marketplace. Id. at 497, 
516. 
 230 Id. at 501. 
 231 Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 232 Id.; Ralph A. Rossum, The Textualist Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 28 PERSPS. ON POL. SCI. 
5, 5 (1999). 
 233 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (repeating his desire to eliminate the 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech that he articulated in 44 Liquormart, 517 
U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 234 See, e.g., Bad Frog Brewery, 134 F.3d at 101 (allowing vulgar speech to be disseminated in 
the marketplace). In Bad Frog Brewery v. New York State Liquor Authority, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that New York’s state ban on the use of a beer label with a cartoon frog 
“giving the [middle] finger” was not a commercial speech restriction tailored enough to further the 
government’s interest in preserving children from vulgarity. Id. The Second Circuit emphasized that 
beer labels are often used in bars where children are more likely to be supervised by their parents. Id. 
at 102. The Second Circuit further reiterated the importance of public information for consumers in 
the marketplace when there is no overriding government interest in a regulationthe principle that 
was reinvigorated in 44 Liquormart. Id. at 96, 101; see 44 Liquormart Inc., 517 U.S. at 503−04 (em-
phasizing the importance of consumer information and choice in the marketplace). 
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the end result that undesirable trademarks would not be profitable and would 
be abandoned.235 
The majority opinion in Tam contained discussion suggesting that the 
commercial speech restrictions at issue should be subject to strict scrutiny be-
cause of the content-based nature of the disparagement clause.236 The Court in 
Tam never explicitly referred to the trademark at issue as commercial speech.237 
The Court declined answering that question because it first determined that the 
regulation at issue was content-based, rather than content-neutral.238 Content-
based restrictions that impart viewpoint discrimination are unconstitutional.239 
As a general rule, the government is prohibited from favoring certain speech 
over other types of speech.240 The Court’s focus on its content-based determi-
nation over the analysis of commercial speech suggests that the distinction be-
tween non-commercial and commercial speech is irrelevant.241 
Further, contrary to Judge Reyna’s analysis, trademarks may not pass the 
Bolger test.242 Trademarks can be registered for both for-profit and non-profit 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See, e.g., Andrew Romano, Pancakes and Pickaninnies: The Sage of ‘Sambo’s,’ the ‘Racist’ 
Restaurant Chain America Once Loved, DAILY BEAST (June 30, 2014), https://www.thedailybeast.
com/pancakes-and-pickaninnies-the-saga-of-sambos-the-racist-restaurant-chain-america-once-loved 
[https://perma.cc/27A2-324D] (providing an example of consumer demand dictating the profitability 
of a mark). The dining chain Sambo’s Restaurant heavily associated itself with the story of the black 
servant, “Little Black Sambo,” by decorating the interior of the restaurant with images from the story. 
Id. Following outcry from leaders in the black community, growth of the allegedly racist restaurant 
chain stalled, which forced the company to close several of its locations. Id. 
 236 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (suggesting that a content-based inquiry determination should 
occur prior to a commercial speech analysis). 
 237 See id. (dodging the question of whether trademarks are commercial speech). 
 238 Id. The Court engaged in a viewpoint discrimination analysis that applies to heightened con-
tent-based restrictions rather than content-neutral restrictions. See Jacobs, supra note 145, at 596−98 
(detailing the application of content-based, content-neutral, and viewpoint discrimination analyses for 
free speech). 
 239 Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749; Jacobs, supra note 145, at 599. 
 240 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (emphasizing the unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimina-
tion); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (reiterating the established principle that the gov-
ernment may not regulate speech it finds offensive); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) 
(same). There is one narrow exception where the government may favor certain types of speech if 
such speech is classified as government speech, meaning the speaker of the speech is the government. 
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (stopping 
the First Amendment inquiry and refraining from engaging in a viewpoint discrimination analysis 
because the specialty license plates at issue, which displayed Confederate flags, were characterized as 
government speech). 
 241 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (holding the disparagement clause is unconstitutional by first 
assessing the content-based nature of the restriction rather than first assessing whether trademarks are 
commercial or non-commercial speech); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (continuing to advocate 
for the elimination of the arbitrary distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech that 
Thomas first articulated in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 242 See Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1379–81 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (arguing that trademarks meet all the 
factors of the Bolger test for determining whether speech is commercial); Pomeranz & Adler, supra 
note 31, at 40–41 (characterizing the Court’s decision in Bolger as a three-part test for determining 
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entities, limiting the economic motivation for the trademark at issue.243 This 
would cut against the third factor of the Bolger test for determining whether the 
speech at issue is commercial.244 For instance, the non-profit group People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals registered their trademark name—PETA.245 
This trademark, like many other non-profits’ registered marks, is used in com-
merce, but not for economic gain.246 Since PETA’s trademark is arguably used 
for non-commercial reasons, the argument follows that the trademark is not 
commercial speech.247 Alternatively, the example suggests that the line between 
commercial and non-commercial speech has become so blurred that it fails to be a 
bright line distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence.248 If, as Justice Thom-
as’s concurrence suggests, the line between commercial and non-commercial 
speech is irreversibly blurred, then speech can only be subjected to a single tier 
of scrutiny.249 By necessity, all speech regulations must inevitably be reviewed 
under strict scrutiny, and this includes restrictions on registering trademarks.250 
III. WHY TRADEMARKS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
AND THE FUTURE OF DILUTION IN THE LANHAM ACT 
If the fate of the commercial speech doctrine follows Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in Matal v. Tam, then all trademark law would have to meet the 
burden of strict scrutiny analysis, and vast pieces of the Lanham Act would 
begin to break apart.251 A great deal of prohibitions in the Lanham Act are ar-
                                                                                                                           
whether speech is commercial); infra notes 243−248 and accompanying text (countering that trade-
marks can be registered for non-profits which arguably do not have an economic motivation compo-
nent). 
 243 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (indicating that “use in commerce” is not synonymous with profit be-
cause there is no prohibition on non-profits registering for trademarks); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (articu-
lating the economic motivation requirement for a commercial speech characterization). 
 244 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 69 (describing the third factor as the economic motivation of the 
speaker); Pomeranz & Adler, supra note 31, at 40–41 (dissecting the Bolger decision into a separate 
factor analysis). 
 245 PETA, Registration No. 2941086; Tait, supra note 42, at 932. 
 246 Tait, supra note 42, at 932; see NORML, Registration No. 0997137 (registering word mark for 
educational services on marijuana); NRA, Registration No. 1885345 (registering word mark for gun 
advocacy). 
 247 See Tait, supra note 42, at 932 (arguing that non-commercial speech elements override any of 
the commercial elements of the trademark). 
 248 See id. (advocating for removal of the commercial and non-commercial speech distinction). 
 249 See GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137 (defining strict scrutiny as the level of judicial review 
accorded to non-commercial speech). 
 250 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating for the elimination of 
intermediate scrutiny analysis of trademark regulations); GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137 (detail-
ing the importance of protecting speech interests). 
 251 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (defining the prohibition on misdescriptive marks); id. § 1125 
(defining the restriction on marks that dilute registered marks); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 
(2017) (Tam III) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for a strict scrutiny analysis for trademarks); In re 
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Tam II) (Reyna, J., dissenting) (criticizing the adop-
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guably content-neutral and not content-based, but the Court found in Tam that 
the disparagement clause was content-based, and thus unconstitutional, be-
cause it allowed examiners to engage in viewpoint discrimination.252 In Tam, 
the disparagement clause was content-based, yet the Supreme Court bypassed 
any analysis of whether the disparagement clause was to serve the purpose of 
mitigating any secondary effects.253 The immoral and scandalous clause faced 
the same problem before the Court in Iancu v. Brunetti.254 The Court’s affirma-
tive holding impacts not just federal law but state law as well, as more than 
forty states also prohibit registration of scandalous or immoral trademarks.255 
By arguing that the bar on misdescription is not narrowly tailored enough to 
survive strict scrutiny because it prohibits some truthful—albeit potentially 
misleading—speech, an entity could likely successfully argue that the bar on 
misdescription is arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional.256 Alternatively, an 
                                                                                                                           
tion of strict scrutiny analysis for trademark restrictions and favoring intermediate scrutiny analysis 
for commercial speech). 
 252 137 S. Ct. at 1758; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (describing prohibitions on trademarks that are iden-
tical to each other, merely descriptive, or geographically deceptively misdescriptive to combat the 
likelihood of confusion). 
 253 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (refraining from engaging in commercial speech analysis of 
trademarks). 
 254 15 U.S.C. § 1052; see supra note 24 (granting certiorari to In re Brunetti to address whether 
the immoral and scandalous clause is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment). If the 
Court becomes comfortable acknowledging that trademarks are commercial speech, it could set a 
precedent for identifying other forms of commercial speech, such as corporate spending on campaign 
finance. See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (addressing the Court’s reluctance to engage in a commercial 
speech analysis); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340, 371 (2010) (refraining from distinguish-
ing between corporate speech and commercial speech). This could potentially set the stage for altering 
the precedent in Citizens United v. FEC, which is criticized by a majority of Americans. See 558 U.S. 
at 371 (eschewing any commercial speech distinction and instead holding the federal ban capping 
campaign finance expenditures by corporations violated the First Amendment); GREENFIELD, supra 
note 16, at xi–xii (describing Citizens United as one of the most despised Supreme Court decisions); 
Greg Stohr, Bloomberg Poll: Americans Want Supreme Court to Turn Off Political Spending Spigot, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-28/bloomberg-
poll-americans-want-supreme-court-to-turn-off-political-spending-spigot [https://perma.cc/R2Z6-
UM3Y] (demonstrating that 78% of Americans believe the holding in Citizens United should be over-
turned). In Citizens United, the Supreme Court found that political speech from anyone, including 
corporations, was subject to strict scrutiny, and thus the government could not implement regulations 
restricting campaign spending based on the speaker. 558 U.S. at 340. 
 255 See Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be 
Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476, 1477 n.3 (2011) (detailing that forty-seven 
states have statutes that prohibit registration of immoral, scandalous, or disparaging marks); Kimberly 
A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct 
Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 7, 23 n.100 (1994) (describing that forty-six states 
have these restrictions); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparag-
ing Matter Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man’s Vulgarity Be Another’s Registered 
Trademark?, 54 OHIO STATE L.J. 331, 333 n.9 (1993) (detailing forty-four states that have these regu-
lations).  
 256 15 U.S.C. § 1052; see Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (postulating that a strict 
scrutiny analysis would be unsatisfactory for the continuation of trademark regulations). 
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entity could also argue that the restriction is content-based because the regula-
tion favors speech that will not mislead customers.257 It is undisputed that the 
regulation at issue is content-based, but such a determination does not automati-
cally mean strict scrutiny should apply; and, further, if it were to apply, it would 
be a very high burden to meet.258 As Judge Reyna warned in his dissent for the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, if the government’s justification 
for the disparagement clause—to encourage the free flow of commerce—does 
not meet intermediate scrutiny, then it is difficult to imagine what type of re-
striction on trademark registration that permits USPTO discretion will be al-
lowed.259 
Moreover, under a strict scrutiny analysis for trademark regulation, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to justify dilution as a recognized cause of ac-
tion.260 Dilution laws allow the federal government to regulate truthful and 
non-misleading speech because the proliferation of the speech at issue in the 
marketplace tarnishes or blurs the distinctiveness of the trademark, therefore 
“diluting” it.261 In passing the Federal Dilution Act, Congress forbade tarnish-
ment by favoring registered marks and disfavoring the free expression of indi-
viduals.262 
Tarnishment laws allow the government to favor certain types of speech 
over others by permitting the government to decline registering a mark that is 
potentially satirical or sexual but not obscene.263 Such marks would otherwise 
be protected by the First Amendment but, because of tarnishment laws, the 
government is allowed to favor the unblemished reputation of the famous 
mark.264 Under the scope of the Tam decision and, in particular, Justice Thom-
as’s concurrence, it is likely that dilution laws will also be held unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 257 15 U.S.C. § 1052; see Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1380 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (arguing that if the 
government’s substantial interest is not the flow of commerce then it is difficult to imagine what in-
terest would meet this high burden). 
 258 See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 23, at 12 (conceding that the trademark restrictions in § 2(a) 
of the Lanham Act are content-based); GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 137 (indicating strict scrutiny is 
the highest level of judicial review). 
 259 Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 260 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985–86 
(1996); (creating a cause of action for dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment); Ramsey, 
supra note 49, at 837–38 (describing dilution laws as outside of the trademark infringement frame-
work because dilution occurs when the trademark is not false or could conceivably be fraud). 
 261 Oswald, supra note 109, at 262–64; Ramsey, supra note 49, at 817. 
 262 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act § 3 (protecting the reputation of registered marks that are 
famous). 
 263 See id. (refraining from creating an exception for satirical or sexual marks). 
 264 See id. (allowing the government to restrict registration of marks that negatively affect the 
reputation of a famous registered mark); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18−20 (1973) (recognizing 
that obscene speech is outside the ambit of First Amendment protections). 
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for being “content-based restrictions.”265 This is despite the fact that the gov-
ernment’s purpose in dilution law regulation is to correct the secondary effects 
of overusing terms in the marketplace and reputational effects on established 
brands.266 The government’s goal of regulating the orderly flow of commerce 
is in line with the general aim of trademark law to serve the dual purposes of 
helping consumers identify products and services and incentivizing companies 
to build their brand name reputation.267 
Further, a commercial speech analysis is appropriate even when the mark 
owner is a non-profit, arguably without economic motivation, because there is a 
distinction between “registering” a trademark and the “use” of a trademark.268 
Although the “use” of a trademark by a non-profit may contain predominantly 
non-commercial aspects, the “registration” of a trademark has overwhelming 
commercial aspects because federal trademark registration only exists within 
the ambit of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.269 Because registering a 
trademark confers national protections, a mark owner seeks these protections 
for exclusive use so that no one else can use the mark in commerce and profit 
from it.270 In addition, registering a trademark has many commercial benefits, 
including, among others, the greater ability to obtain exclusive use rights in 
foreign countries and to prevent others from using your trademark for mislead-
ing and dilutive purposes.271 Moreover, freedom to obtain an exclusive use 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for a heightened strict scru-
tiny standard). This arguably suggests that even when an alleged surface-level content-based re-
striction is at play, the government’s interest in improving the free flow of commerce and information 
to consumers is not a substantial government interest. See id. 
 266 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 
1730–32 (2006) (redefining the causes of action for dilution to only need likelihood of dilution rather 
than evidence of actual dilution); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282–83 (2000) (highlight-
ing the governmental interest in regulating the secondary effects of speech). 
 267 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2 (reiterating the purpose of the dilution act to 
promote the flow of commerce and protect brand reputation); Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1380 (Reyna, J., 
dissenting) (identifying the government’s interest in regulating the orderly flow of commerce); Fox 
Rothschild LLP, Slanting Toward the End of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, ABOVE THE FOLD 
(June 22, 2017), https://advertisinglaw.foxrothschild.com/2017/06/slanting-toward-end-commercial-
speech-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/NK3L-Y95V] (emphasizing that dilution laws encourage brand 
reputation building and the importance of the Lanham Act in standardizing the trademark system to 
help identify goods). 
 268 See Alexandra Martinez, The Act of Registering a Trademark: Commercial Speech, Non-
Commercial Speech, or a Combination of Both?, at 20–21 (2017) (unpublished student note, J.D. 
Candidate U.C. Hastings) (on file with the International Trademark Association), https://www.inta.
org/Academics/Pages/LadasMemorialAward.aspx [https://perma.cc/35TR-FMZS] (arguing the regis-
tration of trademarks is a purely commercial activity because of the exclusive rights of use benefits 
offered to the mark owner). 
 269 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–99 (1879); Martinez, supra 
note 268, at 20–21.  
 270 See Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1377, 1381 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (emphasizing a mark owner’s eco-
nomic motivation to obtain federal trademark protection). 
 271 15 U.S.C. § 1125; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3. 
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right in foreign countries is also freedom from someone else’s competing 
mark.272 These commercial aspects meet the standard set forth in Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Products Corporation and warrant an intermediate scrutiny anal-
ysis of commercial speech.273 
 Should trademarks be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, the implica-
tions would extend beyond trademark law.274 If the Court continues to reject 
the impact of secondary effects in determining whether a restriction is content-
based or content-neutral, while also rejecting a commercial speech analysis, it 
could implicate a much larger subset of government regulation.275 For instance, 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) implemented regulation requiring celeb-
rities and spokespersons to indicate when their content is an advertisement.276 
The FTC’s goal was to prevent consumers from being misled by sponsored 
testimonials.277 With the blurring of the distinction between commercial and 
non-commercial speech that some justices propose, advertisers and companies 
could argue that the FTC’s regulation is content-based because it restricts their 
free expression of sponsored content.278 
In Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land, he argued that even when a regulation is intended to prevent deception, it 
likely passes strict scrutiny.279 This burden of strict scrutiny, however, is still a 
higher burden than necessary for the government, which has limited resources 
and needs a method for protecting against secondary effects of some speech.280 
The regulation is necessary and, moreover, what has been assumed to be in the 
                                                                                                                           
 272 15 U.S.C. § 1125; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 3. 
 273 See 463 U.S. 60, 62 (1983) (identifying the standard for commercial speech based on the ad-
vertising content, product reference, and the motivation of the seller); GREENFIELD, supra note 16, at 
137 (identifying the distinction between intermediate and strict scrutiny); Pomeranz & Adler, supra 
note 31, at 41 (characterizing the decision in Bolger as establishing a test for commercial speech). 
Trademarks meet the requirements set forth in Bolger: (1) trademarks advertise the source of a good 
or product; (2) trademarks indicate the source of a good or service; and (3) trademark applicants, as 
required by law to register a trademark, use their trademarks in commerce, so they have an economic 
motivation. See 463 U.S. at 62; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 274 Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267. 
 275 Id.; see Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (failing to consider any of the government’s arguments for 
the purpose of the disparagement to prevent disruptive activities to commerce). 
 276 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2019). 
 277 Id.; Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267. 
 278 Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267; see Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1749 (suggesting that a con-
tent-based restriction would defeat any argument over commercial speech because the justices would 
choose to narrowly decide the issue rather than determine whether a commercial speech analysis is 
appropriate). 
 279 517 U.S. 484, 500 (1996). 
 280 Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267; see City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 282–83 (emphasizing the 
constitutionality of a restriction that addresses the secondary effects of speech because it is in the 
government’s interest to promote public health and safety). 
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purview of government authority should not suddenly be held to the incredibly 
high burden of strict scrutiny.281 
In a similar vein, city laws that restrict both ride-sharing services and 
room-sharing companies from advertising in their city boundaries could be 
found unconstitutional for favoring certain speech.282 Ride-sharing services 
may argue that the city favors speech against their business and is restricting 
their freedom of expression.283 Further, in Massachusetts, where recreational 
marijuana is legal, restrictions on cannabis advertising may be declared invalid 
and unconstitutional because the government would be suppressing speech 
with expressive marijuana content.284 This would be so despite the fact that the 
state has an interest in promoting public safety, health, and welfare.285 
A commercial speech analysis would save the Lanham Act by reducing 
the burden on the government to prove that ostensibly content-neutral and sec-
ondary effects regulations do not suppress speech.286 In so doing, a commercial 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267 (indicating the potential widespread effects due to 
the Court’s continued resistance to characterize trademarks as needing to meet intermediate rather 
than strict scrutiny analysis). There is a difference between regulating commercial speech and regulat-
ing freedom of expression. See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 282–83 (allowing content-based regulation to 
mitigate secondary effects of public health and safety). The speaker and the speaker’s motivation are 
important for a commercial speech analysis. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67. Without such a distinction 
between speakers, regulations on trademarks will meet the same criticisms of the autonomy and self-
fulfillment theory because there will be an unlimited amount of trademark regulation that will suc-
cumb to First Amendment expression. See supra note 123 (criticizing the autonomy and self-
fulfillment theory for its lack of any boundary in what speech is regulated). 
 282 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (holding the disparagement clause unconstitutional for allow-
ing examiners to engage in viewpoint discrimination); Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267 (connect-
ing the holding in Tam III to consequences in other industries); New York Defeats Taxi Owners, Lend-
ers in Lawsuit Over Rules, Uber, CNBC (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/31/new-
york-defeats-taxi-owners-lenders-in-lawsuit-over-rules-uber.html [https://perma.cc/DG3C-68AA] 
(describing a lawsuit by drivers over the alleged “burdensome regulations” imposed by New York 
City legislators including the high cost of medallions to enter the taxi and limousine service industry). 
 283 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (finding the viewpoint discrimination analysis to determine the 
constitutionality of the speech regulation); Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267 (detailing potential 
arguments by the taxi industry based on viewpoint discrimination); see, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 
U.S. at 489 (granting certiorari on the question presented by alcohol establishments regarding the 
constitutionality of a state law restricting advertisement of their business). 
 284 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (preventing the government from favoring speech that it does 
not find offensive); Fox Rothschild LLP, supra note 267 (emphasizing the consequences of the 
Court’s use of a viewpoint discrimination analysis without first engaging in a commercial speech 
analysis); 935 MASS. CODE REGS. 500.105 (2019) (restricting marijuana advertisements to adults and 
prohibiting content catered toward minors). 
 285 See Tam III, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (failing to be persuaded by the government’s interest in pre-
venting the secondary disruptive effects on the free flow of commerce in the presence of disparaging 
materials). 
 286 See In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting the government’s interest 
proposed to satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis for the immoral and scandalous clause of the Lanham 
Act). 
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speech analysis of trademarks would preserve the government’s ability to regu-
late the public’s interests.287 
CONCLUSION 
Trademarks are commercial speech. The Central Hudson test should be 
the standard for reviewing trademark restrictions. Otherwise, aspects of the 
Lanham Act when held to a strict scrutiny standard are in jeopardy, creating a 
slippery slope to erode the usefulness of the Lanham Act altogether. Taken to 
its logical conclusion, the Tam Court suggests that if trademarks are not com-
mercial speech, trademarks would have the same free speech rights as individ-
uals. Although some speech is inherently not protected, such as fraud and def-
amation, the rest of trademark regulation would have to meet the high burden 
of strict scrutiny analysis. With case-by-case challenges to pieces of the Lan-
ham Act on the horizon, the USPTO would lose its power to control trademark 
registration. Leaving the government with very little room to correct market 
defects, trademark law falls apart. Trademark law is necessary for the free flow 
of commerce. Trademarks allow us to make intelligent decisions when pur-
chasing goods based on the source of the good and the reputation attached to 
the mark. Without trademarks, there are fewer incentives for individuals and 
entities to build their brand name reputations. This leads to less of an incentive 
to innovate. If trademarks are not viewed as commercial speech through an 
intermediate scrutiny lens, then it is likely inevitable that trademark registra-
tion as we know it today will cease to exist. Without trademarks, there would 
be a domino effect of negative reactions, leading to chaos in the marketplace. 
MEAGHAN ANNETT 
                                                                                                                           
 287 See Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government has a substan-
tial interest in regulating the free flow of commerce to protect against secondary effects of speech). 
  
 
